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Table of ICE Area of Responsibility (AOR) Jurisdictions
Area of Responsibility Jurisdiction
Atlanta Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina
Baltimore Maryland
Boston Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island,Vermont
Buffalo Upstate New York
Chicago Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin, Missouri, Kentucky, Kansas
Dallas North Texas, Oklahoma
Denver Colorado, Wyoming
Detroit Michigan, Ohio
El Paso West Texas, New Mexico
Houston Southeast Texas
Los Angeles
Los Angeles Metropolitan Area (Counties of Los Angeles, Orange,
Riverside, San Bernardino), and Central Coast (Counties of Ventura,
Santa Barbara and San Luis Obispo)
Miami Florida, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands
New Orleans Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee
New York City
The five boroughs (counties of NYC) and the following counties:
Duchess, Nassau, Putnam, Suffolk, Sullivan, Orange, Rockland, Ulster,
and Westchester
Newark New Jersey
Philadelphia Delaware, Pennsylvania, West Virginia
Phoenix Arizona
Salt Lake City Utah, Idaho, Montana, Nevada
San Antonio Central South Texas
San Diego San Diego County, Imperial County
San Francisco Northern California, Hawaii, Guam, Saipan
Seattle Alaska, Oregon, Washington
St. Paul Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota
Washington District of Columbia and Virginia
v
Table 2
Timeline of U.S. Immigration Enforcement Programs & Priorities, 2010–Present Period
Pre-PEP PEP Post-PEP








Priorities for the Apprehension,
Detention, and Removal of Aliens
o Secure
Communities
































1. Terrorism, espionage, national
security threats, violent or
aggravated felony, gang
membership (16+), outstanding
criminal warrants; public safety
risks.
2. Recent illegal entry (recent
immigration violation at borders &
ports of entry) and visa abuse.
















with final order of
















National Distribution of Arrestees by Enforcement Period (n=94,326)









Pre-PEP 10/1/2014 11/19/2014 5962 6.3%
PEP 11/20/2014 2/19/2017 87406 92.7%
Post-PEP 2/20/2017 2/28/2017 958 1.0%
vii
Table 4.













Washington 20.755 44% 29.977 -16% 25.113 -11% 22.225
New Orleans 28.014 31% 36.704 -12% 32.330 -24% 24.602
New York City 18.946 31% 24.809 -20% 19.961 -15% 16.946
Boston 22.910 29% 29.576 -6% 27.747 -32% 18.952
Atlanta 23.438 29% 30.253 -24% 23.048 -14% 19.753
Newark 24.139 28% 31.018 -2% 30.433 -40% 18.252
Baltimore 22.087 17% 25.868 -21% 20.516 -18% 16.887
Dallas 24.534 14% 28.065 -1% 27.692 -10% 24.968
ALL AORs 23.253 8% 25.113 -6% 23.716 -2% 23.200
El Paso 25.325 8% 27.333 -4% 26.356 -10% 23.623
San Diego 22.470 6% 23.801 -7% 22.253 -9% 20.143
Phoenix 47.193 5% 49.618 -33% 33.315 53% 51.002
Miami 24.403 4% 25.395 -14% 21.892 -19% 17.643
Philadelphia 37.624 3% 38.826 0% 38.695 -15% 32.751
Chicago 23.262 2% 23.835 -14% 20.579 -9% 18.801
San Antonio 12.615 1% 12.693 26% 15.963 16% 18.494
Buffalo 30.906 -1% 30.529 0% 30.673 -1% 30.397
Los Angeles 28.720 -4% 27.469 3% 28.389 -9% 25.724
Houston 18.080 -5% 17.162 -2% 16.743 23% 20.517
San Francisco 31.621 -7% 29.435 -2% 28.910 -3% 28.001
Seattle 27.878 -8% 25.621 -8% 23.682 -1% 23.519
St. Paul 22.625 -9% 20.637 -5% 19.668 -5% 18.745
Denver 31.453 -9% 28.643 -1% 28.321 -39% 17.346
Salt Lake City 19.947 -10% 17.985 18% 21.262 1% 21.542
Detroit 24.622 -16% 20.648 -6% 19.462 -17% 16.176
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Table 5
Percent Differences Across Three Enforcement Periods, by AOR (Ranked Greatest-











Washington 16.219 66.840 27.060 -23.491 20.703 27.647
Boston 16.852 66.308 28.026 -42.712 16.056 -4.726
Newark 18.385 61.685 29.726 -15.978 24.976 35.851
El Paso 19.295 38.839 26.790
New York City 16.120 34.659 21.706 -54.832 9.804 -39.177
Atlanta 21.168 24.899 26.439 -31.381 18.142 -14.296
New Orleans 27.448 22.942 33.745 -40.260 20.159 -26.555
St. Paul 18.216 12.646 20.520 -31.689 14.017 -23.050
Miami 20.693 12.468 23.273 -47.316 12.261 -40.747
All AORs 22.064 10.480 24.377 -13.983 20.968 -4.968
Salt Lake City 17.328 9.952 19.053 41.078 26.879 55.119
Philadelphia 35.200 9.808 38.653 -33.082 25.866 -26.518
Dallas 25.220 9.215 27.544 -11.591 24.352 -3.444
San Antonio 13.077 5.213 13.759 -36.666 8.714 -33.364
Buffalo 29.590 4.484 30.916 -22.020 24.109 -18.523
Baltimore 21.152 2.980 21.783 -59.389 8.846 -58.179
Phoenix 43.367 2.878 44.615 30.119 58.053 33.864
Denver 28.295 -0.863 28.051 -51.051 13.731 -51.473
San Diego 22.156 -0.986 21.938 -3.684 21.130 -4.634
Chicago 22.206 -1.144 21.952 -10.855 19.569 -11.874
Los Angeles 28.288 -1.760 27.790 -8.370 25.464 -9.983
Houston 17.859 -3.916 17.160 7.286 18.410 3.085
San Francisco 31.089 -6.010 29.221 -43.922 16.386 -47.292
Detroit 23.182 -12.617 20.257 -41.225 11.906 -48.641
Seattle 30.708 -19.508 24.718 -17.248 20.455 -33.391
*AOR El Paso had no
cases in the Post-PEP
period











PEP) SE 95% Conf. Interval
Newark 3.358 159.766 11.341 3.377 4.671 18.010
Boston 4.179 155.461 11.174 2.674 5.892 16.456
Washington 6.223 304.190 10.841 1.742 7.413 14.269
El Paso 1.435 24.410 7.494 5.224 -3.277 18.265
New Orleans 2.390 148.893 6.297 2.635 1.091 11.503
New York City 2.769 182.096 5.587 2.018 1.605 9.568
Atlanta 4.452 764.084 5.271 1.184 2.947 7.595
Philadelphia 1.342 243.357 3.453 2.573 -1.615 8.521
Miami 1.260 441.971 2.580 2.047 -1.443 6.603
Dallas 1.570 590.258 2.324 1.481 -0.584 5.232
St. Paul 1.013 183.493 2.304 2.275 -2.184 6.792
All AORs 5.653 6813.730 2.276 0.403 1.487 3.066
Salt Lake City 0.957 211.175 1.725 1.803 -1.829 5.278
Buffalo 0.393 89.057 1.327 3.373 -5.376 8.029
Phoenix 0.472 226.205 1.248 2.642 -3.958 6.454
San Antonio 0.750 628.318 0.682 0.909 -1.103 2.466
Baltimore 0.129 50.515 0.630 4.871 -9.150 10.411
San Diego -0.099 168.892 -0.218 2.197 -4.556 4.120
Denver -0.070 95.531 -0.244 3.506 -7.203 6.715
Chicago -0.115 249.317 -0.254 2.218 -4.622 4.114
Los Angeles -0.305 401.246 -0.498 1.634 -3.711 2.715
Houston Area -0.916 1218.190 -0.699 0.763 -2.197 0.798
San Francisco -0.640 171.140 -1.869 2.921 -7.633 3.896
Detroit -0.920 108.456 -2.925 3.181 -9.230 3.380
Seattle -1.196 88.658 -5.990 5.009 -15.943 3.962
* p<.05 (right-tailed; diff > 0)
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Table 7
Comparison of Means for Post-PEP and PEP Periods, by AOR (Ranked by Value)




(Post-PEP) SE 95% Conf. Interval
El Paso - - - - - -
Denver 2.562 12.728 14.320 5.590 2.217 26.423
New Orleans 2.622 21.610 13.586 5.182 2.827 24.345
Baltimore 3.657 15.035 12.936 3.537 5.398 20.475
San Francisco 2.547 21.654 12.834 5.039 2.374 23.294
Philadelphia 2.974 41.715 12.787 4.299 4.110 21.465
Boston 2.241 27.458 11.971 5.341 1.021 22.920
New York City 3.113 23.735 11.902 3.823 4.007 19.797
Miami 3.618 50.060 11.012 3.044 4.899 17.125
Detroit 1.820 15.971 8.351 4.589 -1.378 18.081
Atlanta 2.691 75.079 8.297 3.083 2.155 14.438
Buffalo 1.408 23.585 6.808 4.836 -3.184 16.799
St. Paul 1.647 29.632 6.503 3.949 -1.566 14.571
Washington 1.376 32.282 6.357 4.619 -3.049 15.762
San Antonio 2.877 20.860 5.045 1.753 1.397 8.693
Newark 0.495 20.589 4.750 9.597 -15.233 24.733
Seattle 0.523 10.250 4.263 8.146 -13.828 22.355
All AORs 3.912 983.585 3.411 0.872 1.700 5.122
Dallas 1.769 258.117 3.193 1.805 -0.362 6.747
Chicago 0.475 35.787 2.383 5.015 -7.790 12.555
Los Angeles 0.627 56.002 2.326 3.709 -5.104 9.756
San Diego 0.126 26.493 0.808 6.431 -12.398 14.014
Houston Area
-
0.566 111.508 -1.250 2.208 -5.626 3.126
Salt Lake City
-
1.546 28.297 -7.827 5.063 -18.193 2.540
Phoenix
-
2.173 18.368 -13.438 6.184 -26.412 -0.463
* p<.05 (right-tailed; diff > 0)




Correlations of Mean CHI Score and Mean Proportion of U.S. Population Subject to
Sanctuary Policies, by Enforcement Period
Pre-PEP PEP Post-
PEP
r 0.080 0.061 -0.0100
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Table 9
One-Way ANOVA of Arrestee CHI Score over Enforcement Period
Enforcement
Period
Mean Std. Dev. n
Pre-PEP 22.064 30.079 5,962
PEP 24.377 30.086 87,406
Post-PEP 20.968 26.803 958
Sum of
Squares
df Mean Square F
Between
Groups




Total 8,5237,294.300 94,325 903.655
*p<.05
Table 10
One-Way ANOVA of Arrestee CHI Score over Area of Responsibility
Sum of
Squares
df Mean Square F
Between
Groups








Two-Way ANOVA of Arrestee CHI Score over Area of Responsibility
Patrial Sum
of Squares
df Mean Square F
Model 90.736 23 3.945 16.21*
AOR 90.736 23 3.945 16.21*
Residual 22,955.983 94,302 .243




Figure 1. A Hierarchical View of U.S. Immigration Enforcement (Hypothesized)
White House
Issues directives, articulates strategic goals and
delegates execution to department leadership
Department of Homeland Security
Establishes plan of action, details
operations that will be carried out by the
agency
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Oversees tactical coordination of
components' activities to ensure
compliance with department directives
ICE Field Office/AOR
Coordinates efforts of agents, makes
discretionary decisions that comply with
agency directives, liaisons with states and
localities to improve capability
State Government/Law
Enforcement Agency
Serves own public, passes its
own policies, cooperates with
federal agencies at discretion
and as required by law
County Government/Law
Enforcement Agency
Serves own public, passes its
own policies, cooperates with
federal agencies at discretion
and as required by law
City Government/Law
Enforcement Agency
Serves own public, passes its
own policies, cooperates with
federal agencies at discretion
and as required by law
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Figure 2. Detainer Issuances, October 2011–March 2014. (Note. From "Detainer
Issuances Nationwide by Month, FY2012–FY2014," by TRAC Immigration)
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Figure 3. Distribution of Arrestees by ICE Jurisdiction (Oct. 2014- Feb. 2017, n=94,326)
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Figure 4. Distribution of Arrestees by CHI Offense Type (Oct. 2014- Feb. 2017,
n=94,326)
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Figure 6.Mean CHI Score Percent Changes From Pre-PEP Baseline, by AOR (Ordered
Least-Greatest Pre-PEP/PEP Change)
xx
Figure 7.Mean Pre-PEP CHI Scores, by AOR (Ranked by Value)
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Figure 8.Mean CHI Scores for Pre-PEP Period Relative to Sanctuary Population Ratio,
by AOR (r=0)
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Figure 9.Mean CHI Scores for PEP Period Relative to Sanctuary Population Ratio, by
AOR (r=0.048)
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Figure 10.Mean CHI Scores for Post-PEP Period Relative to Sanctuary Population Ratio,
by AOR (r=-0.096)
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Figure 11. A “Coercive Federalism” Illustration of Institutional Relationships and Policy
Flow in Immigration Enforcement Consistent With Enforcement Data Analysis from Pre-























































CAP Criminal Alien Program
CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection
DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security
DOJ U.S. Department of Justice
EOIR Executive Office for Immigration Review
ERO Enforcement and Removal Operations
FOIA Freedom of Information Act
GAO U.S. Government Accountability Office
ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
IIRAIRA Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
INS Immigration and Naturalization Service
LEA Law Enforcement Agency
MSCC Most Serious Criminal Conviction
SC Secure Communities
SCAAP State Criminal Alien Assistance Program
TRAC Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse
USCIS U.S Citizenship and Immigration Services
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Introduction
In the United States, the purpose of the immigration enforcement system is to regulate the
flow of noncitizens into the country and ensure that those individuals (whether inside or
outside its jurisdiction) comply with the immigration laws (Siskin et al., 2006). This
broad mission entails many tasks: preventing unauthorized access at borders and ports,
maintaining records of noncitizens who visit or reside in the U.S., detecting individuals
who ought to be removed for unauthorized presence or criminal behavior, and
apprehending/detaining those individuals so that they may be deported to their country of
origin. The purpose of the present research is to explore how the immigration
enforcement system performs these last functions—detection, apprehension, and
detention—and, in particular, what factors determine who becomes subject to these
enforcement actions.
This thesis is organized into four sections: 1) an overview of immigration
enforcement; 2) a review of theories of presidential power over “federated” law
enforcement linked to a discussion of prior research on immigration enforcement
targeting, with the research question and central hypothesis that have been tested; 3) the
methods and analysis plan employed; and 4) the results and a discussion thereof.
The first section provides a brief overview of the federal immigration
enforcement bureaucracy—its functions, history, and structure. This overview also
delves into the programs that are central to interior enforcement operations by expediting
the identification and apprehension of deportable individuals. These programs are
highlighted as examples of a federated law enforcement system since they rely heavily on
xxvii
partnerships between federal and nonfederal agencies. This working knowledge of the
enforcement system enables a discussion of executive-level policies from the Obama and
Trump administrations that sought to affect the operations of those programs by ordering
federal immigration authorities to prioritize the apprehension of some individuals over
others—individuals who have committed serious criminal offenses, for example. These
policies are presented as a timeline of subtle but significant changes to the definitions of
enforcement priorities.
The second section introduces the research question and hypothesis in the context
of theoretical explanations for the behavior of a federal law enforcement bureaucracy,
first by referencing presidential dominance models that claim the President (and, by
extension, presidential policy) holds great influence over federal agency activity. This
influence, in theory, is made possible by the formal and informal powers granted to
Presidents, as well as the experience they may accumulate through the course of
managing their staff. It follows that presidential policy can directly control the operations
of the immigration enforcement system, and that any changes to the latter can be
associated with the former. However, it is necessary to discuss the limitations of this
theoretical perspective. Because presidential dominance necessarily focuses on the
President himself, it excludes the role of the other parties integral to federated
immigration enforcement, that is, nonfederal institutions, as well as passive resistance in
federal agencies. A framework of coercive federalism is introduced as a means for
understanding the extent and nature of Presidential influence on the execution of federal
policy. This framework posits that the behavior of states and localities can be explained
in terms of self-interest, due to the historical erosion of cooperative administration and
xxviii
policymaking between different levels of government. Therefore, it can be expected that
the immigration enforcement efforts of states and localities will only reflect presidential
policy insofar as it appeals to their own constituents. To illustrate this point, real-world
examples of coercive federalism are presented, where the federal government has clashed
with states and localities who in turn have attempted to thwart enforcement efforts. This
perspective is important because it demonstrates that a federated law enforcement system
guarantees different agencies serve different publics and officials. Any agency at any
level of government may adopt policies or practices that advance their own agendas, but
annul any change that presidential policy intended to create. Together, the presidential
dominance and coercive federalism frameworks form the theoretical basis for the main
hypotheses: that change occurs from presidential policy, and that states and localities who
limit their cooperation with federal authorities temper that change within their own
jurisdiction. These theories are then related to prior research on immigration
enforcement, the research questions, and central hypothesis of the study.
The third section introduces the data and methods that were used to answer the
study’s research questions. The Crime Harm Index (CHI) is also introduced as a
preferred metric for measuring the impact of presidential policy on immigration
enforcement targeting.
The study's analysis uses the CHI to calculate the seriousness of criminal offenses
(if any) committed by noncitizens who have been targeted by immigration enforcement,
and to determine if there are any associations between changes in CHI values and the
creation or termination of presidential policies. These analyses are then replicated across
different federal immigration enforcement jurisdictions, testing for the sensitivity of the
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hypothesis at different parts of the political mosaic that comprises the United States. The
analysis is followed by the conclusions and discussion, which address the shortcomings
of the present research and suggest additional avenues through which empirical
understanding of immigration enforcement can be further improved in future research.
The importance of the present research can be summarized by the following
points:
1. U.S. immigration enforcement is a complex and opaque system that
deserves increased scrutiny from researchers who are concerned with institutional
justice, especially as it relates to the apprehension and detention of noncitizens.
2. The quantity and detail of empirical research on immigration enforcement
has lagged behind the bureaucracy's growth in size and importance in the realm of
public policy. Current measures for immigration enforcement too often conflate
serious and nonserious immigrant offenders when describing the size and nature
of immigrant crime, all the while providing little insight on the efficacy of the
system in executing executive policy of any kind.
3. Improving the available metrics, especially the application of a Crime
Harm Index, will be an important step to discovering evidence for holding federal
immigration agencies to higher levels of accountability and public policy debates.
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I. Federal Immigration Enforcement: An Overview
According to estimates from 2015, the United States' foreign-born population is
approximately 44.7 million, or 13.4 percent of the total U.S. population (Krogstad, Passel
& Cohn, 2017). Of those 44.7 million, 33.8 (75.5 percent) are either naturalized citizens,
lawful permanent residents, or temporary lawful residents. The estimated remaining 11
million are unauthorized immigrants who either entered the United States without
inspection or possessing valid authorization, or who overstayed the time period allowed
by their authorization. These same estimates have concluded that the unauthorized
immigrant population has not seen any significant growth since the 1990s. Despite this
lack of growth, federal spending on immigration enforcement has increased more than
twofold, from 8.2 billion in 2003 to 19.3 billion in 2016 (AIC, 2017b), as measured by
the combined annual budgets of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the two agencies that constitute the bulk of
federal immigration enforcement efforts.
As this bureaucracy has grown in size, so too has political and public interest in
the immigration issue. For decades, immigration has stood as a major point of contention;
disagreements over immigration programs and spending in the legislature have routinely
slowed the passing of other bills (Mascaro, 2018), while state and local noncooperation
with federal immigration authorities has brought new light to the ongoing debate about
the reach of executive authority in law enforcement matters (Rosenberg, 2017). The
present research explores this relationship as it pertains to immigration enforcement
operations specifically.
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In the United States, these policies must be filtered through a decentralized
structure of law enforcement agencies at multiple levels of government, from the White
House, through one or more cabinet departments, the operating federal agencies, 50 states
(and their own laws), elected county sheriffs or executives and councils, municipal
mayors, councils and police chiefs, individual law enforcement officers, and so on until
policies eventually reach local governments and police departments across the country.
In the execution of policy, many complex interactions between competing conceptions of
the mission of immigration enforcement complicate what some might see as the clear
divides between administrative and operational levels, combined with the supremacy of
federal law. Such clarity may over-simplify reality by implying a hierarchy wherein the
decisions made even by the highest federal administrators will affect the operations of
state and local agents. Figure 1 illustrates what may be called the hierarchy hypothesis,
which this thesis attempts to test. The purpose of this research, in essence, is to examine
the extent to which such a hierarchy can be observed in the wake of two separate
Executive Orders signed by two very different Presidents of the United States.
Changes in enforcement policies, marked by the termination and replacement of
programs across presidential administrations, provide an opportunity to explore how
those policies are promulgated at an agency level. More specifically, programs central to
ICE operations during the Obama administration alleged that they prioritized immigrants
who had committed serious crimes, while the transition of power to the Trump
administration marked a departure from that posture to one of full enforcement (wherein
every unauthorized noncitizen is a "priority"). This shift provides an opportunity to study
the impact of accompanying policy changes on ICE activity over time, as measured by
3
the number and criminality of the individuals the agency arrested, as well as regional
variations in that impact.
Because U.S. immigration enforcement is so dispersed, it is necessary to discuss
its complex inner mechanisms. Unpacking the agencies and practices who are involved
in the execution of national-level policy reveals the extent to which federalism explains
this bureaucracy's formal structure. In turn, analyzing immigration enforcement as a
federated system allows for a more nuanced understanding than simply the Executive
Orders of U.S. Presidents.
Immigration Enforcement in the United States: A Federated System
Prior to 2003, all U.S. federal immigration activity—including visa and
citizenship services, border security, and interior enforcement—was consolidated within
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Following the September 11th attacks
in 2001, the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under the 2002
Homeland Security Act dissolved INS in the following year. The INS immigration
functions were transferred to three new DHS agencies. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) assumed the investigative and interior enforcement functions of INS,
and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) its border and port security functions. The
last agency, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), took over the
naturalization and visa services. With the exception of the immigration court system,
known as the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), a Department of Justice
(DOJ) agency, federal immigration functions are concentrated in DHS.
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Though smaller than CBP, ICE can be regarded as the primary enforcement arm
of DHS by virtue of its broad mission: investigating domestic and international crimes,
apprehending removable aliens, and legally representing the United States in immigration
court against those aliens (Strategic Plan). ICE has powers to arrest and detain
removable individuals it has identified through direct action (popularly known as 'raids')
conducted by its own agents. In addition, it has made substantial investments in
programs that treat state and local law enforcement agencies (LEAs) as force multipliers.
These programs can range from passive information sharing that require no action from
the LEA, to active cooperation in the form of holding and interrogating an individual for
suspected immigration violations. For the entirety of the United States and its territories,
interior operations of ICE are administered 'locally' by 25 Enforcement and Removal
Operations (ERO) field offices or "Areas of Responsibility" (AORs) across 18 states.
Some states, such as Texas, have multiple offices; others share the attention of an office
with their neighbors (Table 1).
Immigration Detainers
At the heart of ICE's force multiplier strategy and its respective programs is DHS
Form I-247: the immigration detainer (AIC, 2017c). A detainer is a formal request that
an LEA hold an individual who is suspected of being removable (i.e., deportable) up to
48 business hours past the time they would otherwise have been released (i.e., when
charges have been disposed of through a finding of guilt or innocence; when charges
have been dropped; when bail has been secured; or when convicted individuals have
served out their sentence). A detainer is issued by an authorized immigration official or
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local police officer who has been specially authorized by ICE through one of its force
multiplier programs (see section titled '287(g)'). In effect, a detainer is the immigration
analogue of an arrest warrant, but is issued by ICE to an LEA and carries none of the
legal mandate of a warrant.
In order to issue a detainer, ICE must have probable cause that the individual is
removable. ICE has probable cause if
 It receives an order from an EOIR immigration judge (IJ) to remove the
individual,
 the individual is currently in removal proceedings, or
 there is other evidence supporting probable cause.
Issuing a detainer, however, does not initiate deportation proceedings. If ICE does not
come to assume physical custody of the individual, the LEA is required to release
him/her. Each LEA, furthermore, has discretion as to which detainers to honor (or not)
and under what circumstances. Under the Obama administration, there were multiple
detainer types that could be issued:
1. I-247N, which only requested that the LEA notify ICE of an alien's release
48 business hours prior to the release;
2. I-247D, which requested notification 48 hours prior and detention for up
to 48 hours; and
3. I-247X, which concerned individuals who DHS sought transferred for a
proceeding or investigation.
All detainer types were replaced by a single general form, I-247A, per the directive of
DHS Secretary Kelly in February 2017 (Kelly, 2017). Despite minor changes to its
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contents and means of delivery, the detainer continues to be an important tool in ICE
strategy. How the agency employs detainers in its various programs is discussed in the
three following subsections.
287(g)
In 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRAIRA) was passed into law. Contained within the IIRAIRA was section 287(g),
which empowered ICE to enter formal agreements (Memoranda of Agreements or MOAs)
with state and local LEAs. The primary purpose of these agreements was to delegate
immigration enforcement functions to a select number of the LEA's officers. The powers
that could be delegated were once broad, but were narrowed in 2009 in response to a
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report that highlighted deep flaws in ICE's
implementation of the program. Currently, officers deputized under 287(g) may only
interrogate alleged noncitizens who have been arrested on state or local charges, and
place detainers on those believed to be subject to removal. According to ICE's public-
facing website, as of 2018, the agency has entered into 287(g) agreements with 76 law
enforcement agencies in 20 states, with more than 1,822 state and local officers deputized.
Criminal Alien Program (CAP)
Of all ICE's programs, the Criminal Alien Program is the largest, oldest, most
widespread, and most loosely defined. Consolidating existing programs, ICE formally
created CAP in 2006 with the goal of identifying removable noncitizens who are
incarcerated in jail and prisons, as well as initiating removal proceedings against them
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(AIC, 2013). To this end, CAP empowers ICE to liaison with corrections facilities where
it may screen and interview inmates to identify those that may be removable. Between
institutions, there is no single model for how CAP functions; the extent and manner of
information sharing is an ad hoc process. Cooperation from the institution can vary from
flagging suspected noncitizen detainees to simply granting CAP officers access to all
detainees and facility records. Federal correctional institutions, however, report all self-
identified foreign born inmates to DHS, while state and local facilities typically cooperate
with DHS by providing ICE with a list of people in custody, whom ICE agents then
interview to determine removability. As of April 2016, the CAP program has grown so
that all federal and state prisons, as well as a small number of local jails, are now
monitored by some 1,300 ICE officers, totaling in approximately 4,300 facilities (Kandel,
2016).
Secure Communities (SC) & Priority Enforcement Program (PEP)
Acting essentially as a technology-intensive version of CAP, Secure Communities
allows for automatic, instantaneous information sharing among LEAs, ICE, and the FBI.
During booking, an arrestee's fingerprints are checked against DHS databases in addition
to those of the FBI, with the system automatically notifying the LEA and ICE if the
arrestee is wanted for removal (Dep't of Homeland Security, 2006). In response to a
"hit," ICE will usually lodge a detainer against the arrestee.
The central product of SC is performing this procedure for every individual who
is arrested by police. It also formally established enforcement priority levels by directing
ICE to target national security threats and serious offenders. Unlike either 287(g) or CAP,
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the information sharing facilitated by SC is, in a sense, mandatory for states and localities.
The agreement that forms the foundation for SC is between the FBI and DHS. ICE's
online overview of SC stresses that once an LEA submits information requests to the
federal government, it cannot control where else that information is sent or what it will be
used for. Therefore, a jurisdiction cannot choose to have fingerprints it submits
processed for only criminal history checks, nor can it request that positive identification
not be shared with an ICE field office.
The program was piloted in 2008 under the George W. Bush administration and
was continued under President Obama. It was fully implemented in all fifty states and
five U.S. territories by January 2013. Though SC has since continued to operate at
capacity, ICE's operational posture towards it changed in Nov 2014 with the creation of
the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP). Despite its name, PEP is better described as a
directive from ICE leadership to continue the biometric-based information sharing of SC,
but only seek the transfer of an individual in the custody of an LEA when the he/she has
been convicted of a felony, three or more misdemeanors, or a significant misdemeanor.
PEP also directed ICE, as a general rule, to replace requests for detention with requests
for notification of release, much like the defunct I-247N. In cases where ICE requested
detention, it would have to specify to the LEA that the individual was subject to a final
order of removal or that there was other sufficient probable cause to find him/her
removable (a requirement that was created in response to 4th Amendment concerns
brought against ICE). Both the detainer form reflecting PEP priorities and the alternate
'notification only' form became available in June 2015. Despite the language of the
directive claiming SC would be "discontinued," PEP did not formally prevent, discourage,
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or prohibit ICE from seeking transfer of an individual to its custody. The program was
terminated when Secure Communities was reinstated to its original posture by DHS
Secretary Kelly (Kelly, 2017).
Implications and Challenges for Research
The machinery of U.S. immigration enforcement, though diffused, is no more
complex than that of the U.S. police system itself. Rather, the challenge of examining
ICE's police activities lies with factors unrelated to its broad mission or jurisdiction. In
its relatively brief period of existence, the agency has implemented a myriad of programs
(not all of which have been mandatory or nationwide), and since many policies originate
in agency leadership or higher, policy changes have been frequent, sudden, and subject to
the whims of the political landscape. What is more, ICE's force-multiplier strategy has
blurred the line between definitions of proactive and reactive policing. As it stands,
detection, identification, and detention of removable individuals is heavily automated and
activated by the state/local LEA that encounters the individual, but whether ICE assumes
custody for him/her is left to the federal agency's discretion. Presumably, ICE assumes
custody when it has probable cause that the individual is removable, and intends to place
him/her in removal proceedings. However, taken against extralegal factors such as
institutional norms, operational demands, and inter-agency relationships, the
circumstances that lead to a transfer of custody become less obvious. The third factor
especially should remind researchers that ICE, by virtue of being in a federated system
and of relying on other LEAs, is not a closed system. Noncompliance by state and local
governments and/or LEAs may have as much an impact as executive policy on the types
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of individuals that are transferred into ICE custody. The first step in unraveling any
policy impact is a clear description of those policies; that is, what they directed ICE to do,
and how they differed from one other as products of their respective administrations.
A Question of Presidential Policy Impact: from Obama to Trump
When PEP was established, it directed ICE to rely on notifications of release more
than detainers and to require more serious criminal activity before taking enforcement
action against an individual. Though Secure Communities' central operation, automated
information-sharing on arrested individuals, continued throughout the 2013–2017 period,
PEP's creation can be said to have created three distinct sub-periods of ICE enforcement
posture: pre-PEP (2010–2014), PEP (2014–2017), and post-PEP (2017–present). In the
pre-PEP period, enforcement priorities were defined by the directives of SC, which were
less discriminating in their targeting and put no constraints on the issuing of detainers. In
the PEP period, enforcement priorities and standards were tightened to target more
serious offenders; and in the Post-PEP period, enforcement priorities saw not only a
return to those of Secure Communities, but expansion into a full enforcement posture. A
full examination and comparison of all three sub-periods follows.
Pre-PEP Period (2010–2014)
On June 30, 2010, DHS Assistant Secretary John Morton formally introduced
Secure Communities as a full-fledged program (Morton, 2010). Morton's memo outlined
ICE's enforcement priorities with regard to all stages of enforcement (i.e., apprehension,
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detention, and removal). The SC enforcement priorities that defined the pre-PEP period
were as follows (from highest priority to lowest):
Priority 1. Aliens engaged in or suspected of terrorism or espionage, or who
otherwise pose a danger to national security; aliens convicted of crimes, with a
particular emphasis on violent criminals, felons, and repeat offenders; aliens not
younger than 16 years of age who participated in organized criminal gangs; aliens
subject to outstanding criminal warrants; and aliens who otherwise pose a serious
risk to public safety.
Priority 2. Recent illegal entrants (recent immigration violators at borders, ports
of entry) and visa abusers.
Priority 3. Aliens who are fugitives or otherwise obstruct immigration controls.
The memo stressed that the enforcement actions taken by ICE personnel should reflect
these enforcement priorities when allocating resources towards removing an individual,
exercising prosecutorial discretion, and employing alternatives to detention when
detaining an individual would not serve the public interest (e.g., because the individual is
handicapped or the primary caretaker of a child).
PEP Period (2014–2017)
Four years later, on November 20, 2014, DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson issued two
memos in response to state and local pushback to Secure Communities (Johnson, 2014).
The first memo changed ICE’s operational posture towards the program by directing the
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agency to no longer seek detention when issuing detainers except when they met priority
criteria defined in the second memo. Specifically, ICE was directed to only seek
detention when the individual posed a national security risk, had committed an offense
involving a criminal gang, or had committed a felony or aggravated felony. Furthermore,
the memo directed ICE to specify a final order of removal or probable cause that alien is
removable when seeking detention (as explained in the previous section). Detainer forms
were also modified so that the 48-hour period no longer excluded weekends and holidays.
The definitions of enforcement priority levels were also slightly altered from those of SC.
Priority 1. National security threats, gang members not under 16, and felony offenders
(identical to SC); aliens apprehended at the border or a port of entry.
Priority 2. (i.e., misdemeanants) Aliens convicted of three or more separate
misdemeanors other than traffic offenses or offenses for which an essential element was
the his/her immigration status; those convicted of significant misdemeanors; unlawfully
present individuals who illegally entered or reentered the U.S.; and aliens who are
deemed by an ICE officer to have significantly abused the visa or visa waiver program.
Priority 3: (i.e., other immigration violations) Aliens who have been issued a final order
of removal on or after January 1, 2014—unless they qualify for asylum or other relief;
individuals deemed not a threat to the integrity of the immigration system or otherwise an
enforcement priority.
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The directives to ICE as they related to detainers and the changes to the priority levels
collectively formed PEP. With regard to the latter, the key difference between PEP and
SC was the substitution of recent illegal entrants for misdemeanants in the second priority
level.
Post-PEP (2017–Present)
In January 2017, the Trump administration issued an Executive Order entitled
"Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States." The order directed DHS
to prioritize for removal individuals who match the following criteria (Executive Order
No.13768, 2017):
 convicted of any criminal offense
 charged with any criminal offense, where such charge has not been
resolved
 committed acts that constitute a chargeable offense
 engaged in fraud or willful misrepresentation in connection with any
official matter or application before a governmental agency
 abused any program related to receipt of public benefits
 subject to final order of removal, but have not complied
 poses a risk public safety or national security
The order was soon followed by a directive then-DHS Secretary Kelly issued in February,
less than one month later. The Kelly memo, whose main function was to relay the
Executive Order, officially terminated PEP and directed ICE leadership to hire more
personnel, as well as to expand the agency's existing programs to all possible
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jurisdictions. The breadth of the criteria put forth by the Executive Order and Kelly
memo effectively makes any unauthorized immigrant an enforcement priority, marking a
clear shift away from the notion of prioritizing serious offenders.
Does Presidential Policy Matter?
It is clear that ICE's enforcement posture in the 2013–2017 period is defined by
two major policy shifts, marked respectively by the creation and termination of PEP. The
first was an increase enforcement efforts against felony offenders and repeat
misdemeanants, and seeking detention only for such individuals. The second shift was an
increase in enforcement efforts against all potentially removable individuals without
regard for their criminal offending (or lack thereof). Both of these policy shifts took the
form of presidential directives handed down to ICE by way of senior DHS leadership
(Table 2 highlights these changes in the form of a short timeline). Knowing the diffuse
bureaucracy through which these policies must travel raises the following question: can a
President's policies truly change who ICE decides to arrest? Answering that specific
question requires a more general discussion of whether any policies that originate with
the President, not just immigration enforcement ones, correspond with changes in the
activity of federal agencies. Section II explores the literature that argues for the
affirmative, as well as perspectives that posit other influences acting in tandem.
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II. Theories of Presidential Power and Coercive Federalism: Context for the
Research Questions and Central Hypothesis
Empirical examination of immigration enforcement operations as they relate to
Presidential policies might reveal whether those policies 'work,' but they will not reveal
how they work, nor will they identify other potentially important factors. Political
scientists have expounded upon different causal mechanisms linking Presidential policy
to operational change, some of which have focused on the President himself. This notion
has led to the rise of a so-called Presidential dominance perspective, which offers that the
President's authority and disposition as the most senior administrator of the executive
branch can explain President-driven policy change. The Presidential dominance model,
however, leaves no room for any role of states and localities to influence the execution of
policy. For the discussion of a federated law enforcement system, this exclusion is too
great to overlook. A coercive federalism framework supplements the explanation that
"Presidential dominance" provides by presenting the activity of nonfederal governments
as a separate, hindering influence on the downstream execution of Presidential policy.
This section begins with the separate consideration of both the Presidential dominance
and coercive federalism perspectives. Their respective answers to the question "how
does Presidential policy produce change in immigration enforcement practices?" are
weighed and combined to produce a single hypothesis test of 1) whether ICE changed its
targets in response to PEP or 2) whether the policies of different geographic ICE regions,
as well as governments of states and localities, created enduring barriers to a direct
reflection of Presidential Executive Orders.
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Presidential Dominance & the Power to Persuade
A single model for explaining the behavior of federal bureaucracy remains a point
of contention among political scientists (Hammond & Knott, 1996). Some scholars
present the controlling force as Congress, others, the President, others the courts, and
others the agency's own autonomy. Similarly, advocates of each approach suggest that
arguments for other power centers overstate that institution's influence. When a president
enacts a policy to further his administration's goals, he does so believing that he either
directly or indirectly influences the activity of federal agencies. This tacit assumption has
invited scholars to theorize on how this control operates. The rule-based, hierarchical
perspective offered by models of presidential dominance offer one possible explanation
for why immigration enforcement priorities would change in the wake of presidential
directives: the President influences the bureaucracy because he has authority over it.
Scholars have long entertained the notion that the President controls the bureaucracy,
since he has considerable latitude when appointing senior administrators (Moe, 1987),
influencing agency budget submissions (Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1988), exploiting
congressional divisions within agency-relevant committees, and manipulating
administrative procedures (Cooper & West, 1989; Moe & Howell, 2004; Nathan, 1983;
Waterman, 1989). PEP is an example of the last method, showing how a president may
extend his control to as fine a level as an individual agency's rules and procedures.
Despite the President's seemingly unilateral authority, political scientists have
also pointed out that his formal powers alone do not give him the power to enact policy
(Neustadt, 1991). The execution of presidential policy rests on the cooperation,
persuasion, and willingness of all individuals engaged in the administrative process. To
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that end, a President cannot hope to accomplish anything if he resorts to commanding his
staff, comprised of hundreds of men and women who have their own independent sources
of shared power. Neustadt's account of Truman’s predictions for Eisenhower's
presidency illustrates this point:
"He'll [Eisenhower] sit here," Truman would remark…"and he'll say, 'Do
this! Do that!' And nothing will happen. Poor Ike—it won't be a bit like the
Army. He'll find it very frustrating…I sit here all day trying to persuade people to
do the things they ought to have sense enough to do without my persuading
them…That's all the powers of the President amount to." (Neustadt, 1991, p. 10)
This view does not render the formal powers of the President meaningless, but places
them in a context of shared power between the President, cabinet officers, agency
administrators, and bureau chiefs at the sub-department level. Each agency has an
influence over policy on par with the President, albeit limited to its own statutory sphere.
The President may have nominal central control over its budget and personnel, but he is
only one of the constituents (the others being the agency's own staff, subcommittees of
Congress, and clients inside and outside the government) to which the agency answers.
Within the executive branch, therefore, the "outnumbered" President bears the greater
task of negotiating and granting favors in the hopes of convincing each and every
administrator that what he wants (e.g., an action taken or a policy enacted) is what they
want as well, whereas they only have one President to deal with. However, since many
people require favors from the President in turn, he is able to concentrate his bargaining
power.
Analyses that take an organizational learning approach to federal policy suggest
that a President's power to persuade can be supplemented through the exercise of his
formal powers over personnel. These studies have suggested that administrations evolve
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over time, and that with experience, Presidents become more effective at directing and
managing the bureaucracy by appointing more loyal administrators who will actually
carry out their vision. Krause & O'Connell (2016) make this argument in an analysis of
1,372 Senate-confirmed appointees from 1997 to 2009. Using biographical information
to generate variables about the appointee's loyalty, policy expertise, education and/or
experience, and managerial competence, it was found that, on average, newer Presidents
tolerated more uncertainty in appointee loyalty vis-à-vis uncertainty in competence, a
relationship that inverted with tenure in office. Other analyses offer a caveat, however:
though loyal appointees may be trusted to safely pass down these directives, there is
evidence that they may not be as competent at managing their agencies as career
professionals who not only have more experience, but more of their own persuasion
power from professional reputation and prestige (Gallo & Lewis, 2011; Gilmour & Lewis,
2006).
The literature on Presidential power presents a complex and conflicted reality.
On one hand, the president's formal powers do not allow him to pass off his decisions as
dogma, because other administrators have their own status and powers on which they
may influence policy regardless of the President's directives. As a result, a President's
only option for executing policy is to persuade. At the same time, those formal powers
can indirectly push through policy by surrounding the President with staff over whom he
may have more persuasive power. A model that considers both these points holds
promise for explaining bureaucratic change driven by presidential policy. Before
forming a hypothesis based on this framework, however, it is first necessary to consider
an opposing perspective. The notion that the federal bureaucracy has several 'masters,' of
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which only one is the President, provides an avenue for discussing others, specifically
nonfederal entities.
Coercive Federalism
Just as power is shared between the President and his administrators, so too is
power shared across all levels of government according to the principle of federalism,
which is ingrained into the Constitution by the Supremacy Clause (U.S. Const. art. VI, §
2) and the Tenth Amendment (U.S. Const. amend. X). Together, the Constitution
requires that laws and actions of the federal government prevail when done so with
powers granted expressly by the Constitution, and that all other powers and authority lie
with the States or the people. Still, there is little guidance on how to balance federal and
state power for any given instance, a fact which has contributed to the ubiquitous
overlaps of authority in many areas of policy (Waxman & Morrison, 2003). It has fallen
to scholars to create models for defining the role that states, localities, and the federal
government may be expected to play in federalist issues, as well as predicting their
behavior when faced with the ambiguity of statute.
One explanation for how different levels of government behave in the event of
federal-local differences emphasizes the influence of self-interest. Scholars exploring
intergovernmental relationships have largely adopted a historical approach to tracking the
decline of cooperation between levels of government. Historical evidence has led
researchers to theorize that the current political landscape is better described from a
'coercive' or 'opportunistic' perspective, in which the political interests of an individual
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jurisdiction supersede the goals shared by all levels of government, explains both federal
efforts to control the states and vice versa.
Kincaid (1990) defines coercive federalism as the decline of the federal
government's reliance on using fiscal tools to stimulate cooperative policymaking—in
favor of using regulatory tools to ensure the primacy of federal policy. Using the context
of economic and public service policy, Kincaid highlights the 1954–1978 period as the
high point of intergovernmental cooperation, which was characterized by great
expansions to federal power by the judiciary, peaks in federal aid to states and localities
(both in absolute terms and as proportions of jurisdictions' revenues), and the
proliferation of those grants to a variety of governmental and nongovernmental
institutions. A combination of factors—postwar affluence, memories of the Depression,
and a growing call for reforms to promote equity and individual rights—fueled the
transformation of American polity with the national government cast as the providing
partner. This success, Kincaid argues, also assisted the demise of cooperative federalism,
as it ultimately placed the federal government in a position of dominance. Policy
preferences became increasingly defined by a federal government that was becoming less
tolerant of intergovernmental friction. On the states' side, a tax revolt in California, as
well as the establishment of an international trade and foreign relations committee by the
National Governors' Association in the 1960s and 1970s signaled resistance to the federal
management of policy on behalf of states and localities, a feeling that was aggravated by
the decline of affluence and a corresponding rise in conservatism during the Cold War.
As evidence for this change, Kincaid points out the number of federal preemptions of
state and local authority, which more than doubled after 1969. He also notes that more
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than half of preemptions enacted since 1789 emerged during the 1970s and 1980s, 10
percent of the nation's 200-year history, and that these preemptions coincided with
reductions of federal aid that had formed the basis of intergovernmental relationships.
However, he also acknowledges that cooperation is still possible in contemporary
government, and that competition between levels of government may in time promote
policy coordination.
Conlan (2006) provides a parallel history, beginning with the creation of the
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations during the Eisenhower administration.
When it submitted its first report in 1955, the Commission endorsed a federated
government as being adaptable and empowering for its citizens. The Commission also
articulated the challenges of federalism, especially administrative complexity. In
studying the role of the federal government in relation to the states, it stressed the
importance of cooperation and coordination between governments, and recommended the
creation of a federal board, which would perform consultative and analytical functions to
sustain dialogue between all levels of government. From there, Conlan echoes Kincaid's
points about the proliferation of federal statutory preemptions, with an emphasis on how
those regulations also became more intrusive. Where Conlan diverges from Kincaid is in
his characterization of the phenomenon. He acknowledges that the federal system today
is more coercive than it once was, but posits that self-interested intergovernmental
behavior is too nuanced to be described purely in terms of coercion. Federal mandates
and highly prescriptive grant programs, he argues, are driven by opportunistic
policymakers (irrespective of ideology) who are trying to serve their own immediate
interests, while states and localities co-opt federal grants in turn to serve equally narrow
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ends (on the federal side, Conlan provides the example of how performance measures
have become tied to budgetary consequences for jurisdictions who receive federal block
grants by policymakers seeking to diminish these programs). The choice policymakers
make—to put the interests of their constituents first by creating policy that benefits their
voters—compels them to adjust the distribution of power between levels of government
so as to exercise authority that once rested elsewhere, leads Conlan to describe it as
opportunistic federalism.
Outside the realm of grants and preemptions, recent times have shown a shift
away from a cooperative paradigm and a movement back to disputes that hark back to as
far as the Reconstruction period. In one of the earliest examples of coercive federalism,
President Grant chose to deploy federal troops to combat the persecution of freed
Memphis blacks in the wake of the Civil War. Those troops were instructed to confine
the policemen instigating the violence until civil authorities were willing to prosecute
them. In anticipation that local police elsewhere would not be swayed by the federal
government's stance on the matter, Grant also generalized this order to all southern states,
stressing to federal authorities that strict and prompt enforcement of that order would be
required (Chernow, 2017, p. 572). Grant's preemption of local officials by using federal
troops illustrates that coercive federalism has old roots as a guide to the flow of policy; it
also anticipated Eisenhower’s own use of federal army power to nationalize the Arkansas
National Guard to enforce the US Supreme Court decision of Brown v. Board of
Education. These 19th and 20th century examples demonstrate that even a 21st century
president cannot assume that local police will respect his preferences, and that they might
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even resist within the bounds of their own power and legal authority to defy federal
directives.
The arguments of Kincaid and Conlan have since been repeated, stressing that the
second half of the twentieth century was marked by an explosion of federal policy
decisions that imposed upon the rights and powers of states (Zimmer, 2005): direct order
mandates, grant conditions, hundreds of statutory preemptions, and regulatory actions.
These impositions also corresponded with a decreasing federal deference to state and
local governments (Posner, 2007). There is ample evidence that coercive/opportunistic
federalism did not end after the Reconstruction period, but rather became normal in the
interactions between the federal and state governments. Through this framework, the
question of whether states or localities influence the federal bureaucracy through their
resistance to Presidential policy can be explored—in a way that is complementary to the
explanation provided by the presidential dominance perspective.
Presidential Power and Federalism in Immigration Enforcement
Theories of presidential power and coercive federalism can both be applied to
immigration enforcement. There is no reason to expect that the flow of policy from the
President to ICE is any less reliant on persuasion than other spheres of policy, or that the
President's formal powers are somehow diminished when dealing specifically with
immigration enforcement. Likewise, ICE programs that rely on state and local
cooperation have also introduced a federalism issue by creating an overlap of authority
that invites conflict and opportunism. The coercive federalism perspective suggests that
the federal government attempts to control the states in order to enhance its own
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enforcement capability, and that states may take actions to subvert that control in the
interests of its own public.
There exists ample historical evidence for coercive federalism at play in
immigration enforcement. While ICE has seen the value of treating states and localities
as force multipliers, it has largely ignored the values and interests of those jurisdiction
that are uninterested in enforcing federal immigration law. This indifference is apparent
with regard to programs ICE has made mandatory (i.e., Secure Communities), but has
taken more subtle forms. With respect to granting local officers enforcement powers
through 287(g), ICE has often neglected to inform LEAs of their rights and
responsibilities when performing immigration functions. As a result, there have been
incidents where police have detained individuals in excess of the legal 48 hours allowed
by detainers due to either ignoring, or not understanding, the law, such as when an officer
misinterprets the detainer as an order rather than a request.
In a similar vein, problems stemming from the costs of these programs—material
and immaterial—for states and localities has not been a priority for the federal
government. The State Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP), whose goal is to
reimburse states and localities for the costs (travel, housing, technology) associated with
participating in federal immigration enforcement, has never been fully funded, nor are the
reimbursements that emerge sufficient to cover all costs (Morse, 2013). Likewise, the
toxic effect of federal immigration enforcement programs on police-community relations
is well documented, especially with regard to 287(g) (AIC, 2017a). The presence of ICE,
even if that presence is only technological (e.g., Secure Communities), creates an
association between local police and immigration enforcement that can discourage crime
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victims and witnesses from assisting law enforcement—for fear that any contact may lead
to discovery by ICE. This mistrust in turn threatens public safety and community
policing efforts. In response to these criticisms, as well as legal challenges that have
emerged from those criticisms, ICE has maintained that it targets only serious offenders
and that its efforts ultimately enhance public safety.
In response to these concerns, some states and localities have passed so-called
"sanctuary" policies that obstruct ICE activity or prohibit state LEAs from participating
in immigration enforcement (AIC, 2017d). More specifically, sanctuary policies may
prohibit LEA compliance with detainers, or impose higher standards on detainer
acceptance, or deny ICE access to facilities where they may interview incarcerated
individuals, or otherwise impede communication and info exchange between an LEA and
ICE. Contrary to popular belief (Park, 2018), sanctuary policies do not conceal or shelter
unauthorized immigrants, nor do they prevent police from enforcing criminal law against
noncitizen offenders. Furthermore, many sanctuary jurisdictions still send booking
information to ICE and lease jail space for housing immigrant detainees.
Despite allegations to the contrary by the Trump administration, sanctuary
jurisdictions are in compliance with federal law, and do not violate 8 U.S.C §1373, which
prohibits state and local governments from enacting laws or policies that limit
communication about “information regarding the immigration or citizenship status” of
individuals with DHS. Rather, it is the federal government that cannot compel
jurisdictions to enforce federal immigration law. The legal basis for this separation in
enforcement has been established by cases such as New York v. United States (1992) and
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Alden v. Maine (1999), which have served to define state sovereignty and the degree to
which federal law binds state legislature.
In response to sanctuary policies, the federal government has more recently made
efforts to compel cooperation with ICE. In August 2017, Attorney General Sessions and
DOJ attempted to withhold federal grant money meant for local enforcement from
jurisdictions that had enacted sanctuary policies. In the ensuing case, the Supreme Court
upheld a preliminary injunction issued by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois on the basis that sanctuary policies do not affirmatively interfere with federal
law enforcement, and that the allocation of local law enforcement resources is ultimately
the decision of state and local authorities. The court also ruled that DOJ has no authority
to interpret the statute (34 U.S. Code § 10151) in such a way that gives it the power to
withhold grants on such grounds (City of Chicago v. Sessions, 2017). Given evidence
that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates (Gonzalez et al., 2017), the insistent
criticisms of those policies by the Attorney General and ICE casts doubt on the sincerity
of claims that prioritization is the agency's foremost concern.
In addition to assistance from Presidential-level initiatives, ICE itself employs a
variety of tactics for identifying and locating individuals in the face of state and local
noncompliance. In the past, ICE agents have made a practice of waiting at courthouses
for individuals who have a court appointment (even as witnesses or victims). Only in
2018 did agency leadership (DHS, 2018) clarify the procedure so that ICE would no
longer arrest friends and family members of the target immigrant unless they posed a
threat to public safety or interfered with ICE actions. ICE officers were also directed to
avoid carrying out enforcement actions in areas that are dedicated to non-criminal
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proceedings, such as family court. The directive, however, did allow agents to make
exceptions without prior approval from supervisors, and recommended that arrests be
made out of public view. An ICE spokesman also stated that witnesses to crimes would
not be targeted even if they had outstanding immigration violations (Rosenberg, 2018).
Such attestations, however, do not represent the entirety of ICE operational
posture, with new initiatives appearing frequently since January 2017. One example:
ICE’s New York office sent letters to the homes of several individuals shortly after they
had interactions with the New York City Police Department, requesting that they come to
the immigration agency’s office in Manhattan. Once there, some were detained and, in at
least two cases, placed in removal proceedings (Devereaux & Knefel, 2018). ICE has
also subpoenaed Facebook to obtain data that the agency used to identify wanted
individuals. It has also accessed data collected privately from automated license plate
readers. (Maass, 2018).
There is also anecdotal evidence that opportunism shapes ICE's enforcement.
Across presidential administrations, there have been multiple high-profile incidents in
which immigration raids against employees sprouted from unrelated criminal
investigations of their employer, raids which were made possible by the referral of
another federal agency to ICE (Garrett, 2018).
These tactics, some of which have been employed only recently, are not an
exhaustive list. The purpose of describing them here is to illustrate the fluidity (and
uncertainty) of multi-level policy cooperation in a federated system that appears to
operate on coercion and opportunism from both levels of government. This relationship
is further complicated by the transition of power to a new administration, which
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inevitably introduces new initiatives and priorities, initiating a long sequence of actions
and reactions as it is passed down from department to agency, and from management to
operations.
Though the executive branch of the federal government appears to be a strict
hierarchy, the articulation of policy even within that hierarchy is not so simple. While
the highest levels of the executive branch articulate goals, they do not necessarily instruct
the agency and its components on how to accomplish those goals. The specific means are
left to agency leadership, whose directives in turn are left for the lower echelons to
translate into practice. At the operational level, decisions may be based on a
jurisdiction's discretion and an agent's imagination, as the above innovations demonstrate.
In the pursuit of their short-term operational goals, whether increasing arrests or filling
detention quotas (Chan, 2017), these agents and offices cooperate and clash with
nonfederal entities in ways that may not have been not anticipated by the original
directive's authors. As a result, a policy's original goals may not be fully realized, or
ignored altogether as they become sidelined by the conflicting interests of a tiered law
enforcement system, wherein different agencies serve different publics.
Prior Research on Policy Changes in Immigration Enforcement
To date, most studies of policy changes governing ICE enforcement patterns have
been largely outside the main criminological literature. Though they track enforcement
activity over time and often frame their results in relation to the enactment of some
federal program or policy (as the present research does), they do not reference theories of
Presidential dominance or federalism in their reports. The explanations these studies
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offer for their trends are therefore heavily speculative and with little empirical support.
Still, these speculations are welcomed as potential further insight into factors influencing
enforcement activity—whether they are rooted in presidential dominance and coercive
federalism theories or not.
The Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) has released numerous
reports on ICE activity as measured by apprehensions, removals, and detainer issuances.
Associated with Syracuse University, TRAC maintains a library of immigration
enforcement and adjudication records that have been obtained via monthly Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) requests to ICE, CBP, USCIS, and EOIR. Using data from the
2002 to 2015 period, TRAC found that ICE's detainer use had been steadily dropping
well before PEP was established (TRAC, 2014a), as shown by a month-by-month
tabulation of detainer issuances prior to PEP's implementation (see Figure 2). The report
also found that the decline occurred in most states, and for those that experienced a
percentage increase in ICE detainer use, the increase in terms of actual detainer issuances
was either small, or later reversed in FY2014.
To explain the pre-PEP decline, TRAC has suggested that past enforcement has
already led to the removal of many serious offenders, leaving fewer such individuals to
detain and locate, but admits that there are insufficient data to support such a claim. The
organization has also posited that the decline was a response to criticism (from
unspecified LEAs, immigration rights groups, etc.) and litigation against Secure
Communities, and thus ICE was issuing fewer detainers where it felt that LEAs would
not comply with them (which would support a coercive federalism perspective). Shifts in
the geographic distribution of apprehensions have also been presented as an explanation
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for the pre-PEP decline; in FY2013, ICE reported that an increasing number of
individuals removed were being transferred directly from those CBP had arrested, which
would preclude the need for issuing a detainer.
Most of the factors TRAC speculates could explain a pre-PEP decline in detainer
issuances—a shrinking offender population, political pressure from activist groups,
litigation, shifts in the geographic distribution of apprehensions—are based in long-term
trends or processes that are outside the explanations presented by presidential dominance
and coercive federalism theories. Resistance from LEAs, however, does fall into the
latter category, which is why the present research includes the role of state and local
resistance in its analysis. In addition, the possibility that changes in the geographic
distribution of arrests may influence enforcement activity suggests that the location of an
arrest may play a role other than as an indicator of state and local resistance.
Central Hypothesis and Research Questions
The focus of the present research is understanding how ICE's enforcement activity,
across its various programs, reflected policy changes as they relate to the Presidential
directives of the 2013–2017 period. To that end, the present research tests the following
hypothesis: that
Presidential directives about the role of the seriousness of crimes associated with
individuals arrested nationwide by ICE actually changed ICE practices when PEP was
implemented, as well as when it was terminated—with seriousness rising during PEP and
declining after its termination.
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This hypothesis is based on the logic of the presidential dominance model. To
further explore the consistency, if any, of the hypothesized impact of coercive federalism,
two additional questions are posed that inform the test of the central hypothesis:
1. Were any national-level changes that occurred uniform across ICE
jurisdictions, or did they all vary across the 25 ICE operational regions?
2. Did state and local noncooperation with ICE have any effects on the types
of individuals being arrested in any specific jurisdictions?
This study further hypothesizes that for a given jurisdiction, relative to national-level
trends and irrespective of the number of arrestees per Area of Responsibility (AOR), a
greater level of noncooperation will be associated with higher seriousness, which in turn
predicts greater bureaucratic compliance under the Obama administration, by virtue of
the former President's tenure at the time PEP was enacted. This logic rests on the basis
that ICE would limit its enforcement efforts to more serious offenders in states and
localities that have passed policies limiting cooperation with the agency.
The present research contributes to existing knowledge of immigration
enforcement by providing insight into the role of federalism in enforcement operations—
either by showing that executive policy does indeed shape behavior at the lowest
operations echelons of the enforcement bureaucracy, or by showing that policy failed to
have any impact. The present research is also an important step to understanding how the
decentralized nature of a federated system allows nonfederal governments to leverage the
authority they possess over their own jurisdiction to thwart federal policy decisions.
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While this part of the analysis may be more speculative in relation to differences across
geographic areas, it is at least one plausible explanation of any such differences that may
be found.
III. Methods and Analysis Plan
The present research explores patterns and trends of ICE decisions to arrest
certain individuals. Therefore, the effectiveness of enforcement as either a deportation or
crime reduction tool is not the purpose of the analysis. Rather, its purpose is to discover
whether there was a trend in the seriousness of criminal behavior of ICE arrestees in
association with the introduction and/or termination of the 2013–2017 executive policies
(using data from 2014 to 2017, as the analysis plan details). Exploring this association
also invites a comparison of changes caused by the Obama administration's policy
compared to the Trump administration's. This section begins by discussing the ideal and
proposed dataset, followed by a description of the analysis plan that includes a discussion
of the Crime Harm Index (CHI) as a way of comparing and aggregating arrestee crime.
Data & Variables
To test the hypotheses that have been put forth, a data source was selected on the
basis that it contained information about individuals against whom ICE has taken direct
enforcement action. Analyses in policy and immigration circles have tended to describe
trends of ICE activity using counts of detainer issuances or removals as their primary
measures, independent of the severity of any criminal charges associated with the persons
being deported. The TRAC Immigration Project is an illustration. As the largest
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academic repository for ICE enforcement data, TRAC has released numerous reports on
ICE removals and detainer issuances over time and in relation to various policies.
An analysis relying on detainer issuances presents a problem, however, because it
encompasses a universe of cases that do not necessarily reflect ICE activity. Detainers
issued by 287(g) or CAP officers offer little insight on the impact of PEP or other
changes to enforcement priorities, since those officers are not ICE agents and are
therefore not subject (or perhaps even privy) to changes in federal enforcement policies.
These locally-generated detainers primarily reflect the decision making of that individual
287(g) officer, making those data less useful to understanding the impact of policy on
ICE operations.
Studies using removal as the unit of analysis, in contrast, suffer from the
methodological challenge of accounting for time delay caused by the unique
circumstances of every immigrant's case with regard to their detention and adjudication:
court backlog, procedural rules, ongoing relief/asylum claims, or outstanding criminal
sentences. Without knowing those circumstances, it would not be appropriate to attribute
their removal to a program's implementation because the two events coincided with each
other.
Due to the shortcomings of using removal and detainer data, the present research
uses neither detainers nor removals; it uses data on ICE arrests—that is, data on
individuals whom ICE has chosen to arrest and transfer into its own custody. The
eligibility criterion for this study is therefore an ICE action that separates arrest data from
all detainer issuances and removals without ICE arrests.
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The study then links each ICE arrest to a way of measuring offense seriousness
for arrested aliens—so as to track changes in that seriousness level over time and through
the course of the policy changes. The analysis also separates arrests and their crime
seriousness levels by region. In order to compare the Areas of Responsibility for separate
tests of the central hypothesis, the study examines both the number and type of offenses
for which arrests were made across the AORs. To that end, the present research uses a
combination of descriptive methods, one and two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA),
and t-tests to determine the magnitude of those impacts.
Source of Data
The ICE Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) library provides readily available
data on immigration enforcement that fit the given criteria and can support the
construction of a seriousness variable. The ICE FOIA library is a collection of datasets,
agreements, and records that ICE has made available to the public in response to various
FOIA requests. Most of the quantitative data are located under the "Immigration
Statistics" section of the library. Most of those statistics report aggregate arrests and
other enforcement actions by region, AOR, or year. Fortunately, however, the library
also allows users to download large volumes of disaggregated data that delineate data on
each individual offender.
The analysis was performed on a dataset titled "Apprehension of Individuals with
Outstanding Removal Orders - FY2015 through Feb. 2017," which is stored in the format
of a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. The universe of cases consists of individuals with final
removal orders from an Immigration Judge against persons who have been arrested by
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ICE (i.e., actually transferred into the agency's custody, not just detained by an LEA)
from October 2014 to February 2017. That sample consists only of individuals with final
removal orders, a point which merits clarification. An Immigration Judge (IJ) issues a
final removal order at the end of a removal hearing when the noncitizen has not been
granted some form of relief. The IJ may issue the order to that individual in the
courtroom, or in absentia, thus instructing ICE to execute it. Those with final orders are
not by definition more likely to have criminal convictions than those who do not, or those
at any other step of the enforcement process. ICE does not need final removal orders to
arrest someone, so an arrest has no direct association with an individual's criminal
offending. Therefore, their arrest remains a reflection of ICE decision-making on
selecting targets for apprehensions by ICE itself.
Though the data include arrestees from every ICE jurisdiction (i.e., nationwide),
they do exclude other segments of the unauthorized immigrant population: removable
individuals who have not entered the system, subjects of detainer requests who have not
yet been transferred into ICE custody, those whom ICE has arrested without final
removal orders from an IJ, those currently detained in immigration facilities or are
awaiting adjudication, and those who have been removed from the United States.
Variables
Attached to each individual case (i.e., arrestee) is the date at which they were
apprehended by ICE. Knowing when the arrest was made and the start/end dates of
policies from the 2013–2017 supported the creation of a categorical variable with three
categories identifying each arrest as occurring during one (and only one) of the Pre-PEP,
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PEP, or Post-Pep periods. This variable is the measure of what federal policies were
active when an arrest was made.
The location of each arrest is recorded in a variable that lists one of the 24 ICE
AORs. Referencing the DHS Declined Detainer Outcome Report for the week of
February 11–February 17, 2017, the analysis identified which states and localities passed
sanctuary policies and the approximate time it was passed (month and year). Using this
information, the analysis created a variable expressing the percent of population in each
region covered by jurisdictions with active sanctuary policies in the AOR where an
individual was arrested, when they were arrested, and assigned that percentage to each
case respectively. The result is a ratio-level variable measuring state and local resistance
to ICE by AOR, which is the primary avenue for exploring the hypothesized influence of
coercive federalism on enforcement activity.
Together, the enforcement period and the measure of state/local resistance
comprise the parameters of the analysis. The dependent variable, the seriousness of
arrestee crime, requires more exhaustive discussion, for it involved the creation of a
Crime Harm Index (CHI) built from the dataset's existing information on an individual's
most serious criminal conviction.
The Logic of a Crime Harm Index
The analysis required a way of measuring seriousness for the crimes of arrested
individuals. The simplest method would have been to categorize offenses based on type
(homicide, robbery, theft, etc.) and count how many offenders/incidents there are for each
type. Differences over time and between jurisdictions would then be made by comparing
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each period or jurisdiction's respective counts. ICE typically tracks its activity using this
method; it provides counts of how many individuals with criminal offenses have been
arrested, deported, or detained in a given region and period of time, then compares it to
previous counts. However, for any measure of enforcement that uses a count of
individuals, someone whose only offense is illegal entry contributes to the overall
criminality of arrested aliens as much as one who has committed murder. Policies that
are based on this oversimplified reporting are likely to overestimate both the prevalence
and severity of criminal acts committed by the unauthorized population.
An alternative method exists that avoids this problem. Summing all crimes into a
single count or total has long been criticized by scholars such as Sherman (2007, 2010,
2011, & 2013) as a misleading metric that distorts policing decisions. In a supplement to
crime counts, Sherman proposes, a weighted Crime Harm Index (CHI) could be created
to provide a very different understanding of the harm done by crime.
The method of a CHI is to determine the harm of each crime reported to police by
victims or witnesses. By including only crimes that are reported at the initiative of
private citizens, the CHI isolates its measurements from the influence that changes in
police operations have on the number and types of crimes discovered (e.g., for such
proactively enforced crimes as drug smuggling or traffic speeding violations). The CHI
calibrates the harm of each crime type based on the number of recommended number of
prison days that crime would entail for one incident for one first-time offender (if
convicted). To avoid the costs of constantly computing an actual sentence lengths each
year, as the Canadian Crime Severity Score does, the Cambridge Crime Harm Index
(Sherman et al., 2016) relies on the number of days on judicial sentencing guidelines.
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Ideally, the specific weighting comes from a 'starting point' method (used in some US
states, such as North Carolina, as well as in England and Wales). This “starting point” is
associated with the relative severity of the offense on its own compared to all other
offense types, without consideration of any specific offender’s prior criminal history or
aggravating or mitigating circumstances of a specific offense. In addition to being less
expensive than relying on actual average sentence lengths for each offense type, the
standardization of the sentence length ensures a consistent measure of harm across
offenders of varying lengths or seriousness of criminal offending history. A homicide
inflicts the same harm on a victim or community regardless of whether it was a first-time
or repeat offense (Sherman et al, 2016), so that the CHI creates a metric of societal costs
rather than a measure of the offender’s entire life history.
Multiplying the harm weight of each offense type by the number of unique
incidents of that offense type produces a single metric of the total harm done by that
crime type—a CHI total for a jurisdiction. Take, for example, an individual whose
offending history includes illegal entry and three instances of trafficking in fraudulent
immigration documents, both of which are federal offenses. Referencing the US
sentencing guidelines for federal crimes shows that those two offense types have a
severity level of eight and eleven, respectively, and that their presumptive sentences
(irrespective of criminal history and circumstances) are zero to six months and eight to
fourteen months. Taking the median of each presumptive sentence range, the CHI value
of the illegal entry is four months, and the value of the document trafficking is thirty-
three months (3 incidents x 11 months). Combining the harm done by the individual's
total of four convictions, as measured by the CHI, the weighting is thirty-seven prison
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months (or about 1100 days). As this example shows, the CHI can be used not only to
calculate and compare the harm done by an individual's different offenses, but also a total
harm for that individual, which can be compared to other individuals, or aggregated and
averaged to create CHI value averages per person or total weights per 100,000 per year
for groups, regions, and time periods.
The value of a CHI is that it creates a common currency metric across a vast range
of diverse offense types. Using the CHI allows analysts to compare instantly the harm
done in different units or populations, without having to weigh every circumstance and
detail of the respective or constituent offenses. The CHI can also be used to show the
offense types where harm is concentrated. For instance, a count of homicides in a given
region might show that such incidents are rare, but when weighed by sentence prison
days and placed in a CHI, it may reveal that those few incidents account for a significant
portion of the total harm crime does to that area.
With the specific information available about the offenses committed (or charged)
by each individual ICE has arrested, the analysis computed a CHI for each one. The
specific form of a CHI can be constructed to better understand how ICE arrests are
prioritized in terms of harm. The CHI analyses also show how ICE might change its
enforcement practices to better ensure that the number of individuals being arrested
corresponds more closely to the amount of harm their offending does. That, in turn,
comprises a direct test of the Presidential policy hypothesis that is central to the study.
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Constructing a CHI for ICE FOIA Data
The dataset consists of individuals who have committed criminal offenses as well
as those with only noncriminal immigration violations. Illegal entry, re-entry, and false
documents/statements are criminal immigration violations which have sentencing
guidelines, even though they would normally be excluded from a CHI because they are
generated by proactive enforcement (Sherman et al 2016).
But the ICE arrest data also include nonoffenders who have been charged with no
crime at all. These nonoffenders in the data are individuals who have committed civil
immigration violations, such as being present in the US without authorization. A
common example of these civil offenders would be individuals who overstay a legal
student or visitor visa, or foreign crewmen who leave their vessel at port. Instead of a
prison sentence, the punishment for these individuals tends to be barred entry to the
United States. Their presence in the data merits consideration.
Since the priority levels from the SC and PEP eras included noncriminal violators,
excluding them from the analysis would not have provide a complete description of how
these priorities were realized. The lack of a prison sentence also implies that the CHI
values for these individuals would be zero, irrespective of the number of individuals. To
provide that civil immigration violators are represented in the CHI, a weight of zero
months was assigned to them.
Like the UCR, ICE reports only the alien's most serious offense. It was therefore
impossible to calculate a CHI for an individual's total offending history, which is one of
data's shortcomings, and where the proposed analysis deviates slightly from the CHI as
presented by Sherman. However, since the data are uniformly restricted in this way,
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there will be no bias towards any individual by the omission or inclusion of offenses that
would distort their CHI value. Another shortcoming is the temporal and spatial
distribution of the cases; for the October 2014–February 2017 period that the data cover,
the majority of cases fall under 2015 and 2016 when PEP was active, leaving fewer Pre-
and Post-PEP cases to provide a comparison. Grouping the cases by AOR also reveals
that almost a third of arrests for the entire period were made in the Houston and Dallas
AORs, which posed a challenge to answering questions involving regional variation in
policy impact.
The first step of the analysis was creating a CHI for the data, integrating the most
recent editions of the US Sentencing Guidelines for federal crimes with Minnesota state
sentencing guidelines for nonfederal crimes. As a matter of practicality, using one state's
guidelines as a surrogate for all others was preferable to matching an arrestee's offenses
to those defined in the statute of the state in which they were arrested. The latter method
was actually impossible, since the data only provide the AOR, not an individual state.
Using guidelines from multiple states would have also introduced the risk that the
proportion of the CHI attributable to one offense type become a product of a jurisdiction's
leniency or severity towards that offense, rather than the prevalence of that offense.
The development and application of Minnesota guidelines made it an attractive
surrogate for those of other states. Historically, the creation of the Minnesota guidelines
was part of a larger movement in the mid-twentieth century towards legislatively-
mandated sentencing commissions, which were hailed as an important step towards
criminal justice reforms by virtue of being comprised of subject matter experts. Such a
commission would not only be protected from political influence, but its duties would be
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entirely focused on developing, evaluating, and monitoring the guidelines. When the
Minnesota guidelines were first constructed, they eschewed the conservatism of the so-
called Albany approach, which emphasized calculating equations and patterns that best
modeled past sentencing decisions. Instead, they view guideline development "as the
articulation of public policy rather than as the discovery of past practice" (Knapp, 1982).
As a result, the Minnesota guidelines are built to realize legislative intent, and to consider
the consequences of sentencing policies on the rest of the criminal justice system, such as
the size and composition of the corrections population. In their comparison of simulated
sentences under Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Washington guidelines, which share
similar structures and formats, Kramer et al. (1989) make several key points:
 despite their structural similarities, the three guidelines vary in
terms of the overall severity of sentence recommendations and the amount
of discretion retained by the judge;
 Minnesota guidelines were designed so that sentence severity was
directly proportional to the seriousness of the offense, less dependent on
criminal history, and irrespective of extralegal factors (race, sex, age,
employment, etc.);
 Compared to Pennsylvania, Minnesota prescribes slightly less
severe sentences on average, though this may be due to the greater role of
judicial discretion in the former; compared to Washington, Minnesota
treats violent offenses less severely;
 Among all three states, Minnesota guidelines showed the greatest
ranges for nonviolent offenses and the narrowest for violent ones.
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The second point above deserves emphasis, for it made the Minnesota guidelines
more consistent with the logic of a CHI based purely on offense severity rather than
complicated by offender history. Pairing the Minnesota guidelines (which place less
emphasis on offending history than found in many other states) with data that do not
include offending history aided in a consistent measurement. The determinacy of the
guidelines was also useful to the analysis. Since less serious crimes are expected to have
smaller sentences than serious ones, the Minnesota guidelines' variance for them were
expected to have less impact. Likewise, their narrower range for serious crimes helped
prevent the CHI values of violent crimes from dominating the description of arrestee
crime.
Using the principles of the CHI, the Minnesota-recommended number of months
of imprisonment for each state offense was combined with Federally-recommended
imprisonment for federal crimes, which in turn was used in combination to create a
weighted index of the state and federal offense seriousness associated with each ICE
arrestee. Those data were then aggregated to assess the seriousness levels of all
individuals in any given time period or geographic area.
Once the CHI was constructed, every observation (i.e., each individual arrestee)
had a single associated CHI value of the specific offense listed in the data. The data also
contain the AOR responsible for the individual's arrest, as well as the date when they
were arrested, allowing the aggregated CHI values to be plotted over time and across
AORs. The end product of this part of the analysis is a thorough quantitative description
of how arrestee harm was distributed across the United States in the 2013–2017 period.
44
The second part of the analysis tested the before-after change associated with
Presidentially-initiated programs on ICE operations, using the CHI value of arrestees as
the dependent variable. A series of dichotomous measures was used as the set of primary
independent variables indicating whether a given executive program was active when the
individual was arrested.
The central product of the analysis is a comparison of CHI values over time and
across ICE AORS, with specific attention paid to the points at which PEP was
implemented, terminated, and replaced by the full enforcement posture. With this
description, the analysis was able to gain insight into whether these policies had any
effect as through presidential power, and whether state and local resistance exerted their
own influence as resistant partners in a federalist relationship.
Methods
The analysis began with a quantitative description and summary of the data,
which included a count of viable cases (i.e., without missing values in vital variables), as
well as their geographic and temporal distribution. Each unique crime in the dataset was
listed, along with its CHI value and the crime type category in which it was placed.
Finally, the absolute and average CHI values for each crime type calculated and plotted
as trend lines over time for each AOR, as well as the nation in aggregate. Vertical lines
were used to demarcate federal policy changes in the trend lines.
The analysis delineated the major classes of violent crime (e.g., homicide, assault,
criminal sexual conduct, theft, robbery), property crime (e.g., theft, fraud, burglary), and
45
drug crimes. Since this sample is unique by virtue of being comprised entirely of
noncitizens, the analysis also included an immigration offenses category in the CHI.
The end product of the analysis is a comparison of 25 mean trends in CHI levels
across the Pre-PEP, PEP, and Post-PEP periods for each of the 24 AORs and the United
States as a whole. The analysis also point outs specific categories within each CHI that
either contributed greatly to the mean's value or changed dramatically over time. To test
the statistical significance of any changes that occurred in the composition of the mean
CHI values, the analysis performed separate variance t-tests. That analysis was selected
on the assumption that the imbalance of sample sizes between the three periods would
systematically give the PEP-period cases lower variance. Sensitivity analyses were also
performed by tracking percentage changes in mean CHI values. With these results, the
analysis is able to discuss whether any changes that occurred were consistent, as well as
discuss each region specifically as they relate to factors such as the prevalence of
sanctuary policies or proximity to national borders.
Building the CHI and Sanctuary Variables
To each arrestee, a CHI sentence weight was assigned according to the
individual's most serious criminal conviction (MSCC). This process first required
codifying the MSCC by matching its description to that of an offense described in
Minnesota statute (for nonfederal crimes) or the U.S. Criminal Code (for federal crimes).
After pairing the offenses as described in the data with their statutory equivalents, the
respective sentencing guidelines (i.e., Minnesota or U.S.) was consulted to identify the
severity level of that offense. The grids used by both the Minnesota and U.S. guidelines
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calculate sentence length (in months) as a product of the severity level and a criminal
history score (with higher scores indicating a longer criminal history and a longer
sentence). For the analysis, the sentence weight of every offense, both federal and
nonfederal, was calculated by identifying the presumptive stayed sentence for a crime
with its associated severity level and no criminal history.
A ratio variable was created to measure state and local resistance to immigration
enforcement efforts by dividing the population of the sanctuary jurisdictions by that of
their respective AORs. The Declined Detainer Outcome Report provides a list of
nonfederal jurisdictions that have passed policies limiting cooperation with ICE, as well
as a description of the policy, the ICE AOR in which the jurisdiction is located, and the
month and year the policy was created. The population (according to the 2010 census) of
each sanctuary jurisdiction and its respective AOR was obtained from the U.S. Census
Bureau online data tool, FactFinder. The end product is that each observation is
associated with a ratio value describing, at the time of arrest, the portion of the
responsible AOR's population under the influence of sanctuary policies.
IV. Results
The data contain 94,326 observations with complete information on their AOR,
date of apprehension (i.e., the enforcement period in which they were arrested), and
offending history. Almost a third of cases are concentrated in the Houston and Dallas
AORs, and no other AOR exceeds 10 percent of the national total (Figure 3). In terms of
enforcement period, the number of cases that fall under the PEP period greatly exceeds
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that of the Pre- and Post- periods, comprising approximately 93 percent of the total
(Table 3).
The distribution of offense types is more varied. The Most Serious Criminal
Conviction variable, which is the data's primary measure of an arrestee's criminal activity,
describes 363 unique offenses. Grouping these offense into 24 categories shows that
immigration offenders make up approximately 25 percent of the total number of cases.
Of these 23,965 cases, 7,411 (approximately 31 percent) are civil offenders with a CHI
score of zero. The category with the second greatest contribution of cases is drug
offenses (19 percent). No other offense category contributes 10 percent or more to the
national total of cases (Figure 4).
Comparisons of Mean CHI Scores (Percent Differences), by Month, Enforcement Period,
and Area of Responsibility
A national month-by-month trend line (Figure 5) shows that under President
Obama, the mean CHI scores of the MSCC associated with each arrestee rose, relative to
Pre-PEP levels, by approximately 10.5% after PEP was enacted, while it dropped by
approximately 5% within the first month after President Trump signed the Executive
Order nullifying PEP. In the two months of data available prior to the PEP period, the
mean CHI score was approximately 22 months per arrestee. In the twenty-five months of
the PEP period, the mean CHI score rose to approximately 24 months per arrestee. In the
one month after PEP was revoked, the mean CHI score dropped to approximately 21
months per arrestee. Whether it continued to drop even further after that first month
cannot be ascertained from the data that are currently available.
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The data's two endpoints, October 2014 and February 2017, had the lowest mean
CHI scores at approximately 22 and 21 months (respectively), while October 2015 had
the highest score, at approximately 29 months. Organized by year, 2015 had the highest
mean, followed by 2016, 2014, and 2017. The reason for this surge during the middle of
PEP's life and its subsequent decline is not clear, but disaggregation by AOR shows that a
select few may have influenced this trend (Table 4). While 16 of the 24 AORs saw either
decreases or increases of no more than 10 percent CHI value from 2014 to 2015, the
AORs of Washington, D.C., New Orleans, New York City, Boston, Atlanta, Newark,
Baltimore, and Dallas all saw increases upwards of 14 percent, and as large as 44 percent.
PEP's decline in CHI value after the 2015 peak was driven in a similar manner; 16 AORs
showed either increases or decreases of no more than 10 percent CHI value from 2015 to
2016. The remaining 8 AORs had decreases ranging from 12 in New Orleans to 33
percent in Phoenix. The discovery of these "power few" regions suggest that the effects
of PEP not only wavered over time, but that the impact continually varied from one
region to another.
The notion that PEP's effect varied across AORs holds when CHI scores are
aggregated by enforcement period, rather than by month and year as discussed in the
previous paragraph (Table 5). Comparing the Pre-PEP/PEP and PEP/Post-PEP changes
offers a noteworthy parallel. From the Pre-PEP to PEP period, 17 of the 24 AORs had
increases in their respective means, whereas from the PEP to Post-PEP period, 21 AORs
saw decreases. The range of changes in mean CHI scores were similarly varied. The
Pre-PEP to PEP period changes varied from increases as large as 11 months to decreases
as large as 6 months. In the PEP to Post-PEP period, changes varied from increases as
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large as 13 months to decreases as large as 14 months. Percent differences were
calculated to describe these changes in the PEP and Post-PEP periods for reach AOR and
the United States as a whole (Figure 6). The results of these comparisons can be
summarized as follows:
 In the Pre-PEP period, AOR Phoenix had the greatest mean score, at
43.367 months, and San Antonio the least, at 13.077 months (Figure 7).
 With a Pre-PEP baseline, the nationwide aggregate's mean CHI score from
the Pre-PEP to PEP period increased by approximately 10% (Table 5). Of the 24
AORs, 16 had percentage increases. These AORs, ranked from greatest to least
change, were: Washington DC (Δ=69%), Boston (Δ=66%), Newark (Δ=62%), El
Paso (Δ=39%), New York City (Δ=35%), Atlanta (Δ=25%), New Orleans
(Δ=23%), St. Paul (Δ=13%), Miami (Δ=12%), Philadelphia (Δ=10%), Salt Lake
City (Δ=10%), Dallas (Δ=9%), San Antonio (Δ=5%), Buffalo (Δ=4%), Baltimore
(Δ=3%), and Phoenix (Δ=3%). Decreases in CHI mean values were observed in
the AORs of Chicago, Denver, Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles, San Diego, San
Francisco, and Seattle.
 Using a PEP baseline (Table 5) shows that the nationwide aggregate's
mean CHI score decreased by approximately 14% from the PEP to Post-PEP
period. Of the 24 AORs, 20 had percentage decreases. These AORs, ranked
from greatest to least change, were: Baltimore (Δ=-59%), Denver New York City
(Δ=-55%), (Δ=-51%), Miami (Δ=-47%), San Francisco (Δ=-44), Boston (Δ=-
43%), Detroit (Δ=-41%), New Orleans (Δ=-40%), San Antonio (Δ =-37%),
Philadelphia (Δ =-33%), St. Paul (Δ=-32%), Atlanta (Δ=-31%), Washington DC
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(Δ=-23%), Buffalo (Δ=-22%), Seattle (Δ=-17%), Newark (Δ=-16%), Dallas (Δ=-
12%), Chicago (Δ=-11%), Los Angeles (Δ=-9%), and San Diego (Δ=-4%). AOR
Houston, Phoenix, and Salt Lake City had percentage increases.
 A Pre-PEP/Post-PEP comparison produces similar results in terms of
direction to the PEP/Post-PEP comparison. Between the Pre and Post-PEP
periods, the nationwide aggregate's mean CHI score decreased by approximately
5% (Table 5). Of the 24 AORs, 18 had percentage decreases. These AORs,
ranked from greatest to least change, were: Baltimore (Δ=-58%), Denver (Δ=-
51%), Detroit (Δ=-49%), San Francisco (Δ=-47%), Miami (Δ=-41%), New York
City (Δ=-39%), San Antonio (Δ =-33%), Seattle (Δ=-33%), New Orleans (Δ=-
27%), Philadelphia (Δ =-27%), St. Paul (Δ=-23%), Buffalo (Δ=-19%), Atlanta
(Δ=-14%), Chicago (Δ=-12%), Los Angeles (Δ=-10%), Boston (Δ=-5%), San
Diego (Δ=-5%), Dallas (Δ=-3%). Increases in CHI mean values were observed in
the AORs of Houston, Newark, Phoenix, Salt Lake City, and Washington.
While there are exceptions, the mean CHI scores of most AORs (and the United States as
a whole) over enforcement periods, tend to a show an increase following PEP's
implementation, then a decrease following its termination.
T-Tests of AOR Mean CHI Scores, by Enforcement Period
The findings from these descriptive comparisons between regions and
enforcement periods become less meaningful if they are the product of chance. In order
to determine the size of differences between CHI score means across enforcement periods,
and whether they are the result of actual differences in the composition of each AOR-
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Enforcement Period group, a series of independent sample t-tests (using Satterthwaite's
approximation for unequal variance) was conducted to compare the mean CHI scores in
the three enforcement periods—for each AOR and the United States as a whole. The
results of these tests are as follows:
 From the Pre-PEP to PEP period, there was a significant increase in the
mean CHI for the nationwide aggregate of all AORs of approximately 2.276
prison months (Table 6).
o Disaggregated, there were significant increases in six AORS:
Atlanta (Δ=5.271), Boston (Δ=11.174), New Orleans (Δ=6.297 months),
New York City (Δ=5.587), Newark (Δ=11.341 months), and Washington
DC (Δ=10.841 months).
 From the PEP to the Post-PEP period, there was a significant decrease in
the mean CHI for the nationwide aggregate of approximately 3.411 prison months
(Table 7).
o Disaggregated, there were significant decreases in 12 AORs: Atlanta
(Δ=8.297), Baltimore (Δ=12.936), Boston (Δ=11.971), Dallas (Δ=3.193), Denver
(Δ=14.320), Detroit (Δ=8.351), Miami (Δ=11.012), New Orleans (Δ=13.586),
New York (Δ=11.902), Philadelphia (Δ=12.787), San Antonio (Δ=5.045), and
San Francisco (Δ=3.411).
In addition to the nationwide aggregate, there were four AORs that had significant
differences across all three periods and in the hypothesized directions (i.e., increase
during PEP and decrease during Post-PEP): Atlanta, Boston, New Orleans, New York
City. Percent change from Pre-PEP to PEP was the most pronounced in Boston, which
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had the smallest Pre-PEP/Post-PEP percent change. New York had the second greatest
Pre-PEP/PEP change, but the greatest Pre-PEP/Post-PEP and PEP/Post-PEP changes.
Correlations between CHI Mean Scores and Sanctuary Policies, by AOR and
Enforcement Period
No strong correlations in either direction were found between the size of an
AOR's sanctuary population and mean CHI score during any enforcement period (Figures
8, 9, 10), nor were there strong correlations in the nationwide aggregate (Table 8)..
Calculating the proportion of each AOR's population that had passed sanctuary policies
shows that, over all three enforcement periods, the prevalence of sanctuary policies was
greatest in AOR Los Angeles, with approximately 76% of its population living in
sanctuary jurisdictions, followed by Seattle (62%), New York City (60%), and San
Francisco (44%). The AORs of Miami, Phoenix, Detroit, Atlanta, Houston, Dallas, and
Salt Lake City collectively had the lowest mean proportions; none of their constituent
jurisdictions passed any sanctuary policies during the October 2014–February 2017
period.
Analysis of Variance for Enforcement Periods and Area of Responsibility
Using CHI score as the dependent variable, a series of ANOVAs were conducted
to produce the following results (see Tables 9, 10 & 11):
 A one-way ANOVA using enforcement period as the factor variable (Table 9),
which classified arrestees into three groups—the Pre-PEP (n=5,962), PEP
(n=87,406), and Post-PEP (n=958) period—produced a statistically significant
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difference between the enforcement period groups (F(2,94,323)=22.10, p=0.000).
A Tukey post-hoc test revealed that CHI score was statistically significantly
higher in the PEP period compared to the Pre-PEP and Post-PEP periods.
However, there was no statistically significant difference between the Pre-PEP
and Post-PEP periods.
 A one-way ANOVA using Area of Responsibility as the factor variable (Table
10), which classified arrestees into 24 groups according to their respective AOR,
produced a statistically significant difference between the enforcement period
groups (F(23,94,302)=229.15, p =0.000).
 A two-way ANOVA using Area of Responsibility and enforcement period as
factor variables (Table 11) revealed that there was a significant interaction
between the effects of enforcement period and AOR on CHI score (F(24,
94,255)=2.55, p=0.000). Simple main effects analysis revealed also produced
similar findings to the one-way ANOVAs; there were significant differences
between both enforcement periods and AORs.
These results should be considered with caution, however, as the distribution of
CHI scores violates the ANOVA assumption of normality, based on the results of the
Shapiro-Wilk test for normal data.
Discussion
This study examined the Presidential dominance hypothesis that, under the principles of
Presidential power, Presidents Obama and Trump would be able to effect change in ICE
operations through a top-down flow of policy illustrated in Figure 1. The highly-
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televised signatures of Executive Orders attract attention precisely because that
hypothesis is assumed to be correct. Yet the results of this analysis largely falsify that
hypothesis. While there are some small indications of change, the present research
concludes that on balance, the seriousness of criminal charges of ICE arrestees did not
change consistently or substantially in relation to the two Executive Orders. A stronger
case could be made for the hypothesis on the basis that the prevalence of criminal charges
associated with ICE arrestees did increase under Obama and decline under Trump, but
the balance of the other evidence supports the competing “coercive federalism”
hypothesis: that the enduring differences between the regions made them highly
insensitive to the spirit and rhetorical objectives of the Presidential Executive Orders.
With regard to the secondary research questions, regional variance was substantial.
This variance is perhaps the strongest evidence against the Presidential dominance
hypothesis. The regional variance in severity of arrestee crime was so large, before
during and after the policy changes, that it was greater in magnitude from AOR to AOR
than it was nationally over time, as demonstrated by the difference in means and the
results of the ANOVA. The analysis shows that Presidential power is limited, indeed
almost statistical noise, in the face of enduring differences between regions.
A major limitation of the study is the availability of the data, which is far more
available during the years of 2014, 2015, and 2016 than in 2017 and beyond. This means
that these data offer far more insight about the fate of Obama's policies than of Trump's.
The latter's could be just as ineffectual, but there insufficient data to support or refute any
predictions. Regardless, the results still merit some interpretation as they relate to
Presidential power and coercive federalism.
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Interpreting Enforcement Period Differences
Because of the large sample sizes involved, absolute changes in the mean CHI
were predictably modest relative to the large range of possible sentence weights each
offense could have. The percentage differences in AORs provide a slightly more
favorable description of Presidential power across enforcement periods, which produced
mean CHI increases upwards of 60 percent, and decreases upwards of 50 percent.
Likewise, the percent changes in the proportion of civil offenders, and the results of the
ANOVA using enforcement period as a factor variable suggest that enforcement activity
under PEP changed, and produced fewer arrests of nonoffenders. Regardless of the way
changes are described quantitatively (i.e., absolute vs. percent), changes become more
apparent when taken from a conceptual standpoint of the CHI scores.
Determining whether or not PEP 'worked' in the context of each AOR’s average
CHI values requires not just a comparison of those scores relative to each other across
enforcement periods, but comparison to a CHI value that matches the program's
purported goals. PEP's highest enforcement priorities were violent felony offenders,
national security threats, and gangs. Calculating a mean CHI that includes none of the
offenses that fall under those criteria can be calculated approximately 22 months,
analogous to the presumptive sentence for aggravated burglary and other serious property
crimes. During the Pre-PEP period, 12 AORs fell short of this low standard. The PEP
period saw this number shrink modestly to 9 AORs, and the Post-PEP period saw it grow
and surpass the Pre-PEP period, with 16 AORs showing a mean CHI less than 22 months.
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These findings provide evidence that executive policymaking produced modest
changes in the intended directions for both presidents. Each of the executive policies
were followed by statistically significant changes in the severity or type of crimes
targeted by ICE, based on the absolute changes in mean CHI values. Whether these
changes are small or large may be a matter of perspective. But with each new executive
policy enacted, the federal bureaucracy responded.
The results of the t-tests for the nationwide aggregate do show a statistically
significant increase in mean CHI value during the PEP period and an accompanying
decrease in the Post-PEP period, but that significance is far from the aspirations of the
PEP order. The effects are discernible but very small—two and three months of average
recommended imprisonment, respectively—and the consistency of mean CHI scores of
the offense types over all three periods also suggests that neither PEP's implementation
nor its termination yielded arrests of more or less serious criminal offenders.
Interpreting AOR Differences
Table 12 presents a final test of the Presidential dominance hypothesis, based
solely on the extent to which ICE made fewer civil arrests of persons with no criminal
charges during PEP than before or after. Like the mean CHI scores themselves, the
percentage of arrestees with no criminal offense varied greatly from one AOR to another,
with 45 percent of AOR Newark’s arrestees being nonoffenders and 3 percent in AOR
Buffalo during the Pre-PEP period. The results show that, in fact, ICE did respond to
Presidential directives with remarkable consistency, at least compared to the CHI scores.
When President Obama’s PEP order took effect, 18 of the 24 AORs (75%) reduced the
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percentage of ICE arrestees who had no criminal charges and were being removed solely
on the basis of a civil immigration violence (from an average of 12% nonoffenders to an
average of 7%). Similarly, when President Trump’s Executive Order revoked PEP, 20 out
of 23 (excluding El Paso which had no reported ICE arrests in that period) or 87% of the
active AORs reported increases in the proportion of arrestees who had no criminal
charges (from an average of 7% during PEP to 19% after PEP).” Like the percent
differences in mean CHI, these findings present a more favorable view of Presidential
power (by suggesting that PEP led to fewer civil offenders being arrested by ICE).
Indeed, these changes in the proportion of civil arrestees were the strongest evidence for
the Presidential dominance hypothesis, but on balance, the evidence produced by analysis
weighs against it.
Limitations & Relation to Existing Literature
Findings from the t-tests are consistent with TRAC's own report on PEP
(TRAC, 2016), which concluded that PEP only had a modest impact on the number of
detainers ICE was issuing each month. It was found that, based on data from the first two
months of 2016, half of detainer issuances were against individuals with no criminal
record, and that four out of five issuances requested detention, in defiance of the stricter
criteria that PEP required for detention requests.
The present analysis was able to supplement these findings by using data that
included the rest of 2016, as well as the first two months of 2017, providing an
opportunity to make an 'after' comparison for ICE activity under PEP's termination, both
at the national and regional level. The ability to track ICE activity in individual AORs
allowed for the inclusion of state and local factors whose influence has gone largely
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unexplored. The analysis results, however, show that a ratio of an AOR's population
under sanctuary jurisdiction to its total population is not a predictor of mean CHI. This
failure may come from a flaw in the how the nonfederal resistance variable was
operationalized. Using the DHS report for declined detainers produced a variable that
was static over time for each AOR, which mischaracterizes an ongoing and active debate
by reducing it to the implementation of a loosely defined family of policies. In addition,
relying on sanctuary policies alone may not capture the various means by which states
and localities resist ICE and federal policy. Manipulating political/institutional cultures,
litigating, and exercising administrative discretion are all potential sources of resistance
that nonfederal officials can (and indeed have) used to defy the federal government,
regardless of the actors' political leanings.
It is worth noting that there were five AORs with a sanctuary population
proportion of one-third or greater: Los Angeles, Seattle, New York City, San Francisco,
Baltimore, and Philadelphia. These same AORs all showed percentage decreases in the
Post-PEP period (regardless of baseline), with Baltimore showing the greatest decreases
in both (PEP/Post-PEP=-59%, Pre-PEP/Post-PEP=-58%). Of these five AORs, only the
changes in Baltimore and San Francisco were significant across all three periods.
Depending on the enforcement period being used for comparison, their mean CHI scores
decreased by 13 to 15 months in the Post-PEP period. These findings, however, do
reflect any larger pattern in the data and may be considered incidental as they relate to the
search for an improved operationalization of the variable.
In addition to the shortcomings of the state and local resistance variable, the
analysis is further limited by the unbalanced sample sizes between enforcement periods.
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Without data from outside the October 2014–February 2017 period, there remains the
possibility that the data from the Pre- and Post-PEP periods do not capture the full range
of individuals that ICE arrested preceding and following the period when PEP was active.
In other words, there may be fewer serious offenders in the Pre-PEP and Post-PEP simply
because ICE had not yet had the chance to arrest them in the limited time period the data
cover. The analysis also did not consider longer-term historical trends in the volume or
criminality of arrestees, which is one of the explanations TRAC has posited for changes
in ICE detainer issuances. Despite these shortcomings, the data source used by this
analysis was unique in its completeness among other sources located in ICE's FOIA
library. Other datasets lacked information crucial to the analysis; some did not
disaggregate nationwide arrests, others did not pair criminality with the AOR. The
analysis strongly considered using individual-level detainer data that covered the same
period as the arrest data used by analysis, but the former omitted information about an
individual's specific offenses. A FOIA request was submitted to ICE for data that would
address these shortcomings, but did not receive a reply.
The avenues for future research on immigration enforcement are varied and
plentiful. Likewise, the challenges encountered by this research are not insurmountable.
If not state and local resistance, one factor driving regional differences could be the
geographic distribution of unauthorized noncitizens in the United States. Estimates based
on the 2014 American Community Survey suggest that most of the unauthorized
population is concentrated in 20 metropolitan areas (Passel & Cohn, 2017), with the New
York-Newark-Jersey City area leading at an estimated 1.15 million unauthorized
individuals, followed by the Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim area (est. 1 million
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individuals) with no other area approaching 1 million. These estimates also noted that
unauthorized immigrants tend to live in the same areas as lawful ones. Future analyses
may benefit from considering this information—specifically, with respect to how
population composition may influence the number and types of individuals who are
available for ICE to target.
The lack of offending information in the detainer data could also be overcome by
focusing on the classification of an individual's offending into one of the three Secure
Communities threat levels, which the detainer data do include. Analyses that elect to use
arrest data could likewise look at other policy changes that occurred during the PEP
period, such as staffing and leadership changes in ICE. Regardless of the specific data
used, future analyses might consider the historical migration and deportation trends that
TRAC has offered in conjunction with the other factors offered in the previous section:
forms of state and local resistance other than sanctuary policies, as well as the
concentration and composition of unauthorized populations across the United States.
Conclusion
The primary purpose of this study was to find out whether Presidential directives
about how ICE should prioritize (or not prioritize) individuals for arrest based on criminality
actually changed ICE practices, based on when PEP was implemented, as well as when it was
terminated. It was hypothesized that, based on the breadth and depth of Presidential power
over the enforcement bureaucracy, operational changes would occur that matched the intent
of those directives, with the seriousness of crimes rising during PEP and declining after its
termination.
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By measuring the seriousness of crimes in terms of guideline-mandated prison
sentences, the results of the analysis provide an answer to this question. Whether considering
the United States as a whole, or in terms of individual ICE AORs, arrests under PEP were not
systematically directed towards the kind of serious offenders (or level of seriousness of those
offenders) that the directive described, as shown in Figures 5 and 6 (as well as Table 5),
despite some statistically significant between-period changes in some AORs.
One criticism of these conclusions may be that, regardless of whether the CHI is a
'superior' metric for comparing arrestee crime or not, using it to assess the implementation of
PEP (whose goals were based around targeting specially-defined categories of unauthorized
individuals) is an inappropriate or unfair test. Yet the present research, like the Obama
Executive Order, was focused on a quantitative concept of targeting immigration violators
based on the amount of harm they had previously done to crime victims while present in the
U.S. As a matter of both policy and practicality, an immigration enforcement system that
wishes to protect U.S. citizens and residents by removing dangerous individuals requires a
continuous variable for identifying which individuals (or classes of individuals) are causing
the most harm to the public. That is precisely what the CHI provides, and what the three ICE
priority levels fail to provide. Making enforcement decisions based on the CHI findings is a
crucial first step towards measuring how much prioritization was actually implemented
before, during and after the PEP. A count-based system that ignores harm would not be an
appropriate fit for answering this study’s research question.
The results of the analysis regarding the second research question—whether any
national-level changes that occurred were uniform across ICE jurisdictions—suggest that
they were not. The effect sizes of PEP when it was active and when it was rescinded
varied greatly from one jurisdiction to another. The hypothesized cause for this variation,
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that state and local noncooperation with ICE affected the types of individuals being
arrested in their respective jurisdiction, did not find support in the analysis results, as
Figure 8, 9, and 10 illustrate. The lack of strong correlations in either direction between
the size of an AOR's sanctuary population and mean CHI score suggest that state and
local resistance neither increased nor decreased prioritization of serious offenders. This
finding presents the possibility that some other factor outside the coercive federalism
perspective drove the regional variation in PEP's impact, such as changes in state and
local governance or LEA resources.
Rather than making a statement about the power of presidents to create change,
these results suggest that Presidential power faces great obstacles even as it travels the
formal channels of the executive branch, let alone through the informal interface that
exists between federal agents and nonfederal institutions. Indeed, the main contribution
of this research to the existing literature is to further demonstrate how regional
differences in immigration enforcement endure in the face of federal policy changes.
Faced with the quasi-independence of other elected, appointed, and career administrators,
all of whom are legally empowered to influence policy at their discretion (Figure 11), it
seems unlikely that presidents can overcome these regional differences to create a very
high level of consistency—at least not without a major changes to the American


























Offenses Abortion U 3
Aggravated Assault - Family-
Gun
Aggravated
Assault Assault 1st Degree 9 86
Aggravated Assault - Family-
Strongarm
Aggravated
Assault Assault 1st Degree 9 86
Aggravated Assault - Family-
Weapon
Aggravated
Assault Assault 1st Degree 9 86
Aggravated Assault - Gun
Aggravated
Assault Assault 1st Degree 9 86
Aggravated Assault - Non-
family-Gun
Aggravated
Assault Assault 1st Degree 9 86
Aggravated Assault - Non-
family-Strongarm
Aggravated
Assault Assault 1st Degree 9 86
Aggravated Assault - Non-
family-Weapon
Aggravated
Assault Assault 1st Degree 9 86
Aggravated Assault - Police
Officer-Gun
Aggravated
Assault Assault 1st Degree 9 86
Aggravated Assault - Police
Officer-Strongarm
Aggravated
Assault Assault 1st Degree 9 86
Aggravated Assault - Police
Officer-Weapon
Aggravated
Assault Assault 1st Degree 9 86
Aggravated Assault - Public
Officer-Gun
Aggravated
Assault Assault 1st Degree 9 86
Aggravated Assault - Public
Officer-Strongarm
Aggravated
Assault Assault 1st Degree 9 86
Aggravated Assault - Public
Officer-Weapon
Aggravated
Assault Assault 1st Degree 9 86
Aggravated Assault - Weapon
Aggravated











Arson Arson Arson 3rd degree 3 12
Arson - Business Arson Arson 3rd degree 3 12
Arson - Business-Defraud
Insurer Arson Arson 3rd degree 3 12
Arson - Business-Endangered
Life Arson Arson 3rd degree 3 12
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Arson - Public Building-
Endangered Life Arson Arson 3rd degree 3 12
Arson - Public-Building Arson Arson 3rd degree 3 12
Arson - Residence Arson Arson 3rd degree 3 12
Arson - Residence-Defraud
Insurer Arson Arson 3rd degree 3 12
Arson - Residence-
Endangered Life Arson Arson 3rd degree 3 12
Assault Other Assault Assault 4th degree 1 12
Assembly - Unlawful
Disorderly
Conduct Misd 2 12
Bail - Personal Recognizance
All Other
Offenses Misd U 3
Bail - Secured Bond
All Other
Offenses Misd U 3
Battery Other Assault Assault 4th degree 1 12
Bestiality Sex Offense Misd U 3
Body Armor (possession or









Offenses Bribery 4 12
Bribe - Giving
All Other
Offenses Bribery 4 12
Bribe - Offering
All Other
Offenses Bribery 4 12
Bribe - Receiving
All Other
Offenses Bribery 4 12
Bribery
All Other
Offenses Bribery 4 12
Burglary Burglary
Burglary 3rd Degree




2nd Degree 6 21
Burglary - Forced Entry-Non-
Residence Burglary
Aggravated Robbery
2nd Degree 6 21
Burglary - Forced Entry-
Residence Burglary
Aggravated Robbery
2nd Degree 6 21
Burglary - No Forced Entry-
Non-Residence Burglary
Burglary 3rd Degree
(Non Residential) 4 12
Burglary - No Forced Entry-
Residence Burglary
Aggravated Robbery
2nd Degree 6 21
Burglary - Safe-Vault Burglary
Aggravated Robbery
2nd Degree 6 21
Burglary Tools - Possession Burglary
Poss. of Burglary
Tools 3 12
Burning Of (Identify object in
comments)
All Other






1st Degree 8 48
Carrying Concealed Weapon Weapon offense
Certain Persons not
to have Firearms or
Ammunition 3 12
Carrying Prohibited Weapon Weapon offense
Certain Persons not





vice Prostitution Crime 1 12
Compounding Crime
All Other











Offenses Misd U 3
Conspiracy [use when no
underlying offense, such as 18
U.S.C. SEC. 371]
All Other
























































$500 and 2 12
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Subsequent)
Damage Property - Business Vandalism
Criminal Damage to
Property Motivated
by Bias 1 12
Damage Property - Business-
With Explosive Vandalism Arson 3rd Degree 3 12
Damage Property - Private Vandalism
Criminal Damage to
Property Motivated
by Bias 1 12
Damage Property - Private-
With Explosive Vandalism Arson 3rd Degree 3 12
Damage Property - Public Vandalism
Criminal Damage to
Property Motivated
by Bias 1 12
Damage Property - Public-
With Explosive Vandalism Arson 3rd Degree 3 12
Deceptive Business Practices



























Offenses Adulteration 4 12
Drugs - Health or Safety
All Other
Offenses Adulteration 4 12
Drugs - Misbranded
All Other




($2,500 or Less) 2 12
Embezzle - Public Property






Enticement of Minor for
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Engage or Hire a































































Value $301 - $2500)
2
12





Value $301 - $2500)
2
12






















































































































Fraud - Swindle Fraud Theft From Person 4 12





Fraud By Wire Fraud Theft From Person 4 12






Gambling Gambling Gambling Acts U 3






























































Murder 2nd Degree 11
306
70
Homicide-Willful Kill-Gun Homicide Murder 2nd Degree 11 306
Homicide-Willful Kill-Non-
family-Gun Homicide
























Murder 2nd Degree 11
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Indecent Exposure Sex Offense Indecent Exposure G 15
Indecent Exposure to Adult Sex Offense Indecent Exposure G 15
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Making False Report All Other Offenses Perjury 5 18
Misconduct - Judicial Officer All Other Offenses Misd U 3
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Money Laundering-Remarks All Other Offenses Misd U 3




























































































































Parole Violation All Other Offenses Misd U 3
Pass Counterfeited (identify in
comments) Forgery and Counterfeiting
Forgery 1
12
Pass Forged (identify in
comments) Forgery and Counterfeiting
Forgery 1
12












Perjury All Other Offenses Perjury 5 18
Perjury - Subornation Of All Other Offenses Perjury 5 18
Possession Counterfeited
(identify in comments) Forgery and Counterfeiting
Forgery 1
12
Possession Forged (identify in
comments) Forgery and Counterfeiting
Forgery 1
12


















































































Procure for Prostitute Who is Prostitution and Solicits, C 48
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Public Order Crimes Disorderly Conduct Misd U 3
Public Peace Disorderly Conduct Misd U 3






































































































































































































































































































































































Sexual Exploitation of Minor -









Sexual Exploitation of Minor -
Material - Film Sex Offense
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Material - Photograph Sex Offense
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Sexual Exploitation of Minor -
Sex Performance Sex Offense
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Shoplifting Larceny-theft Theft Crimes 2 12
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Violation of a Court Order
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Exporting, or Trafficking (Including Possession
with Intent to Commit These Offenses) 26 70.5
Amphetamine
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Exporting, or Trafficking (Including Possession
with Intent to Commit These Offenses) 26 70.5
Barbiturate -




Exporting, or Trafficking (Including Possession
with Intent to Commit These Offenses) 26 70.5
Cocaine Drug Quantity Table 6 4
Cocaine -
Possession Drug Quantity Table 6 4
Cocaine - Sell Drug
Unlawful Manufacturing, Importing,
Exporting, or Trafficking (Including Possession
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Fraudulently Acquiring Documents Relating to
Naturalization, Legal Resident Status, or a
United States Passport; False Statement in
Citizenship, or Legal Resident Status for Own
Use; False Personation
or Fraudulent Marriage by Alien to Evade
Immigration Law;
Fraudulently Acquiring or Improperly Using a
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Exporting, or Trafficking (Including Possession
with Intent to Commit These Offenses) 26 70.5
Hallucinogen -




Exporting, or Trafficking (Including Possession
with Intent to Commit These Offenses) 26 70.5
Heroin Drug Quantity Table 6 4
Heroin -
Possession Drug Quantity Table 6 4
Heroin - Sell Drug
Unlawful Manufacturing, Importing,
Exporting, or Trafficking (Including Possession
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Unlawfully Entering or Remaining in the
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Immigration Law;
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Naturalization, Citizenship, or
Legal Resident Status, or a United States
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Exporting, or Trafficking (Including Possession
with Intent to Commit These Offenses) 26 70.5
Marijuana
(describe
offense) Drug Quantity Table 6 4
Narcotic Equip
- Possession Drug Quantity Table 6 4
Opium Or
Derivatives Drug Quantity Table 6 4
Opium Or
Derivatives -





Exporting, or Trafficking (Including Possession





Exporting, or Trafficking (Including Possession










Unlawful Conduct Relating to Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 19 33.5










Smuggling, Transporting, or Harboring an
Unlawful Alien 12 13
Synthetic
Narcotic Drug Quantity Table 6 4
Synthetic
Narcotic -
Possession Drug Quantity Table 6 4
Synthetic
Narcotic - Sell Drug
Unlawful Manufacturing, Importing,
Exporting, or Trafficking (Including Possession





Exporting, or Trafficking (Including Possession









Trafficking in a Document Relating to
Naturalization, Citizenship, or
Legal Resident Status, or a United States
Passport; False Statement in
Respect to the Citizenship or Immigration
Status of Another; Fraudulent Marriage to









Trafficking in a Document Relating to
Naturalization, Citizenship, or
Legal Resident Status, or a United States
Passport; False Statement in
Respect to the Citizenship or Immigration
Status of Another; Fraudulent Marriage to








Mishandling of Hazardous or Toxic Substances
or Pesticides;
Recordkeeping, Tampering, and Falsification;
Unlawfully












Unlawful Receipt, Possession, or
Transportation of Firearms or Ammunition 6 4
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